# Dual Labour Markets in Southern Europe. Will Recent Reforms End *Precariat?*


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http://dolado.blogspot.com

ECFIN Annual Research Conference 2017, Brussels, Nov 20<sup>th</sup>

Fostering inclusive growth: Inequality and fairness in integrated markets

# Why do Dual LMs still matter in the policy agenda?




## **Dual LMs and Youth unemployment rates**





#### Proportion of temporary contracts by age groups, 2015



#### What defines a Dual Labour Market?


- Not necessarily the intense use of Temp/Fixed-term contracts (TCs) vs. Open-ended/ permanent contracts (PCs) but more importantly the <u>EPL gap</u> (stepping stones vs. dead ends)
- Wage rigidity and uncertainty about nature of dismissals (redtape costs): TCs become a <u>cost-reduction device</u> rather than a <u>screening device</u>.
- Very high LM volatility: Workers rotate between short-term TCs and unemployment, with low access to PCs (revolving door)

#### **Origins of Dual LMs in EU**

- Southern-EU (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain)
- Common pattern: Dictatorships during 20<sup>th</sup>c. (stringent EPL to prevent social unrest) & subsequent transition to democracy during turbulent periods (oil price crises)
- → Two-tier LM reforms

  France
- Immigration flows from colonies → Lower wages → May 1968 revolt
- $\rightarrow$  Min Wage (SMIC) $\rightarrow$  Stringent EPL  $\rightarrow$  Two-tier LM reforms
- Poland, Sweden, The Netherlands...]
- Use of non-regular contracts (on-call, free-lance, ZHC, commercial law) to:
- (i) foster JC under adverse macro conditions + (ii) facilitate LM incorporation of population groups with low LFP.


# More flexibility through increasing EPL gap (<Great Recession)



Source: OECD (2008)

#### Spain as epitome of a dual LM (pre- Great Recession)





**EPL** gap= Sev. Pay (PC) + Red Tape Costs - Sev. Pay (TC)

#### **Alternative strategies**

Days of wages per year of service

- (PC) Hire 1 worker for 5 years under PC and then fire
- (TC) Hire 5 workers sequentially 1 year each under TC


EPL gap= 8.5 monthly wages


Under wage flexibility, deferrable wages would offset the transfer from employer to employee (Lazear 1990: steeper wage-tenure profile) Otherwise....

⇒ Revolving door !!

#### Dead ends vs. Stepping stones ( % PC in JC and conversion rates )









#### Reviewing the effects of EPL gap on LM outcomes

- Much higher Job Creation (JC) and Job Destruction (JD) of TCs
- Temps receive less training
- Wage pressure by PC workers (buffer effect of TCs)
- Specialization in sectors intensive in use of TC
- Job insecurity, low fertility, deferred parental leave (*Precariat*)
- Countercyclical earnings inequality

# Spain: A bulimic LM (Employment growth, unemployment rate)



Fuente: EPA. INE



#### Integrating results: A Narrative of Dual LM pre-post GR


## From Boom (1996-2007) to Bust (2008-2013...)...to Recovery

- Access EZ → ↓ real interest rate+ easier access to credit →
   Investment boom in low value-added sectors (suitable for TC)
   [→ Bubble → Burst]
- The Wages Less-Skilled workers + Low productivity
- † school dropout rates + Large immigration inflows (low fertility)

#### **Growing imbalances**

- Low TFP growth
- Large competitiveness loss
- Large Current Account deficit

# **Technology choices and relocation shocks in Spain**




# Recent EPL reforms (2010-) (+ Macron's French LM reform)

Policy Area	Country	Year		Policy Changes
Notifica	tion Procedure	е		
	Greece	2010	-	Notice period reduced from maximum of 24 to maximum of 6 months
		2013	-	Notice period reduced from maximum of 6 to maximum of 4 months
	Spain	2011	_	Notice period reduced from 30 to 15 days
Severan	ce Pay			
	Greece	2010	-	Severance pay cut from 2–24 months' wages to 1–6 months (with prior notice) or 2–12 (without prior notice)
		2013	-	Severance pay for workers with more than 17 years of service reduced from 24 to 12 months' wages.
	Spain	2012	-	Simpler modalities for economic redundancies, compensated at 20 days per year
	Portugal	2012 2013	_	Cut and introduction of a ceiling to severance pay Introduction of dismissal compensation fund
	Italy	2012	_	Introduction of a dismissal compensation fund
Length o	of Trial Period			
	Greece	2010	_	Extension of the probation period from 2 to 12 months
Unfair 1	Dismissal: Defi	nition, Co	тре	nsation & Reinstatement
	Spain	2010	_	Economic reasons become a justifiable reason for dismissal Compensation for unfair dismissal reduced
		2011	_	Definition of fair dismissal was extended Obligation of reinstatement in the case of unfair dismissal is
				replaced by monetary sanctions
		2012	_	
	Portugal	2012	-	replaced by monetary sanctions  Compensation for unfair dismissal is reduced from 45 days' wages for every year worked (up to a ceiling of 42 months'
	Portugal Italy		- - -	replaced by monetary sanctions  Compensation for unfair dismissal is reduced from 45 days' wages for every year worked (up to a ceiling of 42 months' wages) to 33 days (with a ceiling of 24 months' wages)
		2012	- - -	replaced by monetary sanctions  Compensation for unfair dismissal is reduced from 45 days' wages for every year worked (up to a ceiling of 42 months' wages) to 33 days (with a ceiling of 24 months' wages)  Factors that justify dismissals broadened  Restrictions to the right to reinstatement in case of unfair
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Definiti	Italy Greece	2012 2012 2013	- - - - al	replaced by monetary sanctions  Compensation for unfair dismissal is reduced from 45 days' wages for every year worked (up to a ceiling of 42 months' wages) to 33 days (with a ceiling of 24 months' wages)  Factors that justify dismissals broadened  Restrictions to the right to reinstatement in case of unfair dismissal due to economic reasons
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
# **EPL gap (Spain post GR; EPL Reform 2012)**

#### **EPL Gap between perms & temps**




**EPL** gap= 4.5 monthly wages (5yrs)


# **Earnings inequality**



# Mismatch: Beveridge curve



#### **Employment by Industry (2008Q2=100)**



#### **Dismantling Dual LMs**


- Collective Bargaining decentralization → Higher wage flexibility (Lazear's offsetting transfer effect)
- Strengthening TC regulations or Reducing restrictive EPL (PC)
- Long entry phases w/o severance pay (stepping stone)
- Single/ unified open- ended contract (SOEC)

Andres et al. (2009), Cahuc & Kramarz (2005), Boeri & Garibaldi (2008), Blanchard & Tirole (2008), Bentolila & Jansen (2010), (P) Ichino (2014), Conde-Ruiz et al. (2011), Cahuc (2012), Boeri et al. (2016), Jobs Act, etc.


#### **Designing a unified EPL scheme (Spain)**

Dolado J, Lale E, and N Siassi (2017), "From Dual to Unified Employment Protection: Transition and Steady State"


Risk averse workers+ Young (liquidity constrained, high search effort) & Older workers (high reservation wage, low search effort) + UI financed by payroll taxes



# Job destruction: No revolving door



# **Smoother Wage profiles**



# Political support

#### B. Political support

All workers Young workers Older workers

87.06	\
99.98	
26.25	/

64.14	21.01	1.91
73.41	25.48	1.09
20.54	0.00	5.71

#### 2012 LM reform

Welfare gain: 1.08% vs. 1.52% (Unified EPL)

Political support 65.4% vs. 87.06%


#### **Robustness exercises**

Table 5. Optimal EPL scheme and welfare effects under alternative calibrations

	Severance pa	ay function	Welfare effect	
	$ au_s$ (in months)	$ \frac{\rho_s}{\text{(in d.w.y.s.)}} $	Steady state	Transition path
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Benchmark	5	20	1.522	0.849
Lower UI benefits	2	17	1.825	1.007
Higher UI benefits	8	24	1.232	0.673
Red-tape costs	6	16	1.564	0.886
Quits vs. layoffs	12	28	0.637	0.276
993 <del>8</del> 79				

NOTE: Each row displays the parameters of the optimal EPL (Columns 1 and 2), the welfare effect as measured by the steady-state lifetime utility of new labour-market entrants (Column 3) and the welfare effects on average across workers in the period when the reform is introduced (Column 4).

Unified contract (Jobs Act in Italy)
Red-tape costs ? Court litigation ?




- Combination of Severance Pay & Contribution to Mutual Fund (Austrian backpack)
- Combination of Severance Pay & Experience rating (bonus/malus)


# Has higher wage flexibility fully offset the EPL gap?




# **Positive effect:** Thazard rates of Temps to first PC




#### **Negative effect: Rise of the Working Poor**




#### % part-time in TC








# Inequality: Changes in Gini coefficient (earnings) 2012-2016



# **Poverty Risk: % households with earnings < 60% median earnings**



# The EPL gap is still alive and kicking: From Bubble to Bubble?



# Thanks for your attention