European Fiscal Rules Comment by

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- Agree: Avoid national/euro area externalities
- Maintain room for stabilisation
- **Plus**: maintain quality of public finances
- Prevent repeat of bailouts and their financial and political costs

Problems with fiscal rules in EU

- Reliance on output gap, structural balance and change in structural balance all problematic (unobservable, unstable)
- Ex-ante and ex-post problems due to measurement, shocks and policy errors hard to separate, who bears risk?
- Measurable targets (-3, 60) and process not time consistent
- Growing complexity, exception seeking, policy opportunism, precedents, and intransparency stoke rule erosion



EU Rules blamed for the right and wrong things

- Pro-cyclical tightening and loosening due to non-compliance in boom, in bust only in crisis countries: YES, but NOT rules
 - Have not succeeded in ensuring sustainability and quality everywhere

YES

 Lack of enforcement mechanism/time consistency due to governance




Pro: expenditure measurable

Debt as sustainability anchor

Con: relies on trend/potential output estimates which are not measurable, plus uncertain inflation outlook

- Proposed mechanism includes same complications (exclusions, exceptions)
- Risk of circumvention via revenue side and off budget expenditure
- Possibly conflict with national budget anchors (deficit/credit)?
- Needs agreement by 27





Governance: Paper has great ideas

- Strengthen national fiscal responsibility/reduce Brussels bashing
- Strengthen role of national fiscal councils
- Analysis and monitoring, opinions (change mandate)
- Comply and explain procedures
- ALL YES—But how to strengthen national implementation of fiscal compacts? Why failed?

Governance and enforcement at European level

- Current enforcement with potential fines and reliance on peerjudgements not effective: YES
- Multi-pronged approach needed (EU rules, markets, national): YES
- EU budget payments conditional on SGP compliance: YES but did not work in past?
- Compliance as pre-condition for stabilisation facility and ESM: YES, but what if always compliance (Italy!)?
- Collective action clauses on all government bonds (ESM Treaty): YES but what about sub-national? Bank credit lines/loans?
- Issuance of junior bonds for spending excess: YES but why the caveat of not destabilising, that is the threat!



- Change Regulations and Fiscal Compact to introduce expenditure rule: NOT SURE, high costs of reaching agreement, might lead to further loosening
- Simplification: YES but what (?), regulations DIFFICULT
- Other: Change Commission internal working procedures/make ECFIN independent?



• Expenditure rule has strong logic

- But proposed framework not easy, not simplification
- Excellent proposals for non-SGP based enforcement

Governance

- Simplification/change of Code of Conduct useful (stronger expenditure base)
- Not sure it is worthwhile to change SGP regulations and fiscal compact
- Commission should strengthen enforcement through internal channels
- Patience; more urgency when debt/interest rates/risk premia rise