

# New Fiscal Rules in the Member State in 2015

Fields marked with \* are mandatory.

## SECTION 1: Description of the rule

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\*1.1 Please choose from: (Please note that this questionnaire is only aimed at **New Rules** or at **Already Existing Rules** that were **not reported previously**)

- The present rule was introduced in 2015
- The present rule was already in force in 2015 but it has never been reported

\*1.2 Please define the nature of the rule:

- Expenditure rule
- Budget balance rule
- Revenue rule
- Debt rule

\*1.3 Please provide a general description of the rule.

\*1.4 Please indicate the main reasons for the introduction of the rule. Please mention any related particular event (such as institutional reform, changes in legislation to adapt to the requirements of EU law, inter-governmental treaties, financial assistance programmes, etc.). Please indicate the date of important decisions taken.

\*1.5 Indicate the approval date of the rule (MM/YY).

\*1.6 Indicate the date the rule entered/should enter into force (DD/MM/YY).

Explanation/additional information.

## SECTION 2: Coverage and target definition

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\*2.1 Are all sectors of the general government covered by the rule? (Please note that for the purpose of this questionnaire we refer to the following sectors of the general government - central government, regional/state government, local government and social security. The questionnaire takes into account that some Member States may not have all of the sectors - in particular regional/state governments.)

- Yes  
 No

\*2.2 Please indicate the sector(s) of general government covered by the rule (multiple replies possible):

- local government  
 regional government (autonomous regions or federated states)  
 central government  
 social security  
 other

\*Please, specify:

Additional information:

\*2.3 Please indicate the share of local government in general government expenditure (in percent): (in case of revenue rules, please indicate the share in terms of general government revenue)

\*2.4 Please indicate the share of regional/state government in general government expenditure (in percent): (in case of revenue rules, please indicate the share in terms of general government revenue)

\*2.5 Please indicate the share of central government in general government expenditure (in percent): (in case of revenue rules, please indicate the share in terms of general government revenue)

\*2.6 Please indicate the share of social security in general government expenditure (in percent): (in case of revenue rules, please indicate the share in terms of general government revenue)

\*2.7 In addition to the rule reported in this questionnaire, is there any other rule in force of the same type and that also targets the same sector but which is not overlapping in coverage with the rule reported here? Please note that complete and unquestionable non-overlap in the coverage of the rules is implied.

- Yes, there are non-overlapping rules in force
- No, the reported rules of the same type and targeting the same sector overlap in coverage
- No, there are no other rules in force of the same type that also target the same sector

\*Please specify which other rule(s) of same type as the one reported here, target(s) the same sector but do/does not overlap in coverage. Explain why.

2.8 Please indicate the accounting system in which the budgetary aggregate targeted by the rule is specified:

- ESA 10' accounting
- cash/budgetary accounting
- other

\* Other, please specify:

Additional information:

\*2.9 Are targets defined in cyclically-adjusted terms or do they account for the cycle in any way (e.g. targets defined over the cycle)?

- Yes
- No

\* Please specify:

\* 2.9a Please indicate the numerical target of the rule:

\*2.10 Please indicate the definition of the budgetary aggregate targeted by the rule:

- Nominal Balance
- Structural balance
- Primary balance
- Primary balance except capital investment
- Other

\*2.11 Please indicate the definition of the budgetary aggregate targeted by the rule:

- Nominal expenditure
- Real expenditure
- Growth of nominal expenditure
- Growth of real expenditure
- Allocation of expenditure to a specific purpose
- Other

\*2.12 Please indicate the definition of the budgetary aggregate targeted by the rule:

- Nominal debt
- Real debt
- Growth of debt (nominal or real)
- Debt to GDP ratio
- Debt as % of current revenue
- Debt service ratio
- Decline of debt (nominal or real)
- Decline of debt to GDP ratio
- Other

\*2.13 Please indicate the definition of the budgetary aggregate targeted by the rule:

- Allocation of unexpected revenue
- Limits on direct tax rates
- Limits on indirect taxes
- Earmarking specific revenue
- Growth of revenue in relation to GDP growth
- Other

\* Please specify:

Additional information:

2.14 Please indicate the unit of measurement of the budgetary aggregate targeted by the rule:

- absolute terms (EUR, etc)
- per cent
- % of GDP
- percentage points related to GDP growth
- percentage points related to a specific concept of economic growth (e.g. potential output)
- other

\*percentage points related to a specific concept of economic growth (e.g. potential output), specify:

\*Please specify:

Additional information:

\*2.15 Are there any exclusions in the coverage of the above rule in the form of items that fall outside authorities' control at least in the short-term (e.g. interest payments, unemployment benefits)?

- Yes
- No

Additional information:

\*2.16 Please indicate the budgetary elements that are excluded from the coverage of the rule (multiple replies possible):

- Interest payments
- Unemployment benefits
- Public investment
- Other

\*Please specify the relevant definition of public investment applied (e.g. gross or net investment, including only specific items, etc.):

\*Please specify:

Additional information:

2.17 In case of revenue allocation rules, please indicate to what area is unexpected or specific revenue to be allocated to (multiple replies possible):

- deficit reduction
- debt reduction
- specific funds (e.g. pension funds)
- other

\*Please specify:

\*2.18 Please indicate the estimated value of items covered by the rule as a percentage of local government expenditure (taking into account exclusions, if any) (in case of revenue rules, please indicate the estimated value as % of local government revenue)

\*2.19 Please indicate the estimated value of items covered by the rule as a percentage of regional/state government expenditure (taking into account exclusions, if any): (in case of revenue rules, please indicate the estimated value as % of regional/state government revenue)

\*2.20 Please indicate the estimated value of items covered by the rule as a percentage of central government expenditure (taking into account exclusions, if any): (in case of revenue rules, please indicate the estimated value as % of central government revenue)

\*2.21 Please indicate the estimated value of items covered by the rule as a percentage of social security expenditure (taking into account exclusions, if any): (in case of revenue rules, please indicate the estimated value as % of social security revenue)

\*2.22 Please indicate the estimated value of items covered by the rule as a percentage of general government expenditure (taking into account exclusions, if any): (in case of revenue rules, please indicate the estimated value as % of general government revenue)

Additional information:

\*2.23 According to its establishing act, which of the following options describes the provided margin of adjustment to the government in specifying the target of the rule?

- The target of the rule, cannot be changed or temporarily suspended except in well-defined situations (i.e. escape clauses)
- The target can only be changed with parliamentary approval
- The government can unilaterally change the rule, but it is legally obliged to publicly justify it
- The government can change the rule at any time: the statutory base of the rule merely contains broad principles of the obligation for the government or the relevant authority to set targets

\* Please give additional details:

\*2.24 Is there a budgetary margin defined in relation to the rule (i.e. the spending targets at the planning stage are set at a lower level than the expenditure ceilings) or a safety margin linked to the MTO which is enshrined in national legislation?

Yes

No

\* Please specify:

2.25 Please describe how the parameters of the rule can be adjusted by the government:

\*2.26 Please indicate the numerical value(s) of the ceiling implied by the rule (e.g., % of GDP for budget balance rules, the amount of a nominal ceiling, allowed growth rate of expenditures, etc.). t refers to the ongoing budget year.

For year t+1

\* ... year t+2

\* ... year t+3

\* ... year t+4

\* ... year t+5



\*2.27 Are there any escape clauses in place?

- Yes
- No

2.28 To what extent are escape clauses specified in the establishing act/legal base of the rule?

- The establishing act lists all events or circumstances that allow for a derogation which are consistent with the SGP
- The establishing act lists all events or circumstances that allow for a derogation of which only some are consistent with the SGP
- The circumstances triggering the derogation are not fully specified, there is some margin for discretion
- Other

\* Please specify below (or upload) the complete list of events/ circumstances that allow for a derogation as indicated in the establishing act:

If instead of specifying the circumstances you have uploaded the list, please write "list uploaded" in the text box below.

Please upload your file

\* Please explain:

\* Other, please specify:

Additional information:

\*2.29 What institution has the task of ascertaining whether escape clauses should be triggered/extended /exited?

- The government
- The ministry of finance
- The parliament
- An independent fiscal institution
- Other

\* Please specify:

\*2.30 Were the escape clauses triggered in 2015?

- Yes
- No

Please specify which provisions, escape clauses, based on which article(s):

If the rule cannot be immediately described in the above terms, please provide a verbal description of the target(s), unit(s) of measurement, and numerical values of the constraint established by the rule:

## SECTION 3: Statutory base of the rule

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\*3.1 Please, indicate which of the following best describes the statutory/legal base of the rule:

- political agreement between governing partners
- commitment made by an authority (e.g., Ministry of Finance, president of a regional government etc.)
- agreement between sectors of general government (e.g., Domestic Stability Pact)
- ordinary (i.e. other than constitutional/organic) law
- organic law
- constitutional law
- other

\* Please specify:

Additional information:

\*3.2.1 What is the time frame covered by the agreement that introduces the rule?

- one-year budgetary cycle
- multi-annual
- legislative period
- other

Additional information:

\*3.2.2 What is the time frame covered by the law that introduces the rule?

- one-year budgetary cycle
- multi-annual
- other

Additional information:

3.3 Please give a precise reference to the official document(s) that form the statutory base of the rule:

3.4 Please upload a pdf version of the above legal text(s) or official document(s) in original language and in English if available.

## SECTION 4: Monitoring of compliance

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\*4.1 Who is in charge of monitoring the ex-ante and/or ex-post compliance with the rule (multiple replies possible)?

- There is no formal monitoring of compliance with the rule
- Ministry of Finance
- Parliament
- Court of Auditors (if not hosting an independent fiscal council)
- Governmental body other than the Ministry of Finance
- Independent fiscal institution
- Other

\*Governmental body other than the Ministry of Finance, please specify:

\*Independent fiscal institution, please specify:

\*Other, please specify:

Additional information:

\*4.2 Is there a real-time monitoring? ("real-time" is defined as quarterly or more frequent)

- Yes
- No

\* Please specify:

\*4.3 Is there a monitoring report issued?

- Yes
- No

\*4.3.1 Please specify how often this is done:

\* 4.3.1 Is there any other output of the monitoring?

\*4.4 Please indicate which of the following applies to the monitoring report (multiple replies possible):

- The government does not usually comment on the monitoring report
- The government is not obliged to comment on the monitoring report, but typically does so (e.g. by a public statement)
- The government is obliged to comment on the monitoring report (e.g. by a public statement)
- The monitoring report is presented in Parliament
- The monitoring report is available to the public

Additional information:

## SECTION 5: Enforcement of compliance with the rule

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\*5.1 Please indicate which body is in charge of enforcing compliance with the rule in case of non-compliance: (multiple replies possible)

- There is no body in charge with enforcing compliance
- Ministry of Finance
- Parliament
- Court of Auditors (if not hosting an independent fiscal council)
- Governmental body other than the Ministry of Finance
- Independent fiscal institution
- body or review panel (other than the independent fiscal institution) specifically created to ensure enforcement of the rule
- Other

\*Governmental body other than the Ministry of Finance, please specify:

\*Independent Fiscal Institution, please specify:

\*body or review panel (other than the Fiscal institution), please specify:

\*Other, please specify:

Additional information:

\*5.2 Does the annual budget document contain a reference to the numerical fiscal rule?

- Yes, there is a chapter devoted to compliance with the rule and/or the specification of the implied target.
- Yes, there is cursory reference to the numerical fiscal rule and/or the implied target.
- No.

Additional information:

\*5.3 Are there pre-defined actions to be taken in case of risk of non-compliance with the targets implied by the rule? (by pre-defined actions we mean corrective measures, sanctions etc.)

- Yes
- No

Additional information:

\*5.4 What best describes best the actions taken in case of risk of non-compliance with the targets implied by the rule? (multiple replies possible)

- the government/the Ministry of Finance is obliged to prepare a proposal of corrective measures for the Parliament/the respective enforcement body
- the government/Ministry of finance is obliged to publicly justify the non-compliance
- the government/the Ministry of Finance is obliged to take specific corrective actions
- there is an automatic correction mechanism (e.g., a cut in next year's resources upon non compliance)
- there is a possibility to impose sanctions
- there is an automatic sanction mechanism in case of non-compliance
- other

\*the government/the Ministry of Finance is obliged to take specific corrective actions, please specify:

\*there is an automatic correction mechanism (e.g., a cut in next year's resources upon non compliance), please describe the mechanism

\*there is a possibility to impose sanctions, please describe the mechanism:

\*there is an automatic sanction mechanism in case of non-compliance, please describe the mechanism:

\*other, please specify:

\*5.4n What best describes the way in which the correction mechanism is triggered in case of deviation?

- the correction mechanism is triggered automatically and there are pre-determined rules framing its nature/size and timeline (automaticity entails the existence of well-defined criteria for determining the occurrence of a deviation and activating corrective measures)
- the correction mechanism is triggered automatically, but there are no pre-determined rules framing its nature/size and/or timeline
- the correction mechanism is not triggered automatically, but there are pre-determined rules framing its nature/size and/or timeline
- the correction mechanism is not triggered automatically, there are no pre-determined rules framing its nature/size and/or timeline, but the government is obliged to take or present corrective measures before the parliament or the relevant authority
- the correction mechanism is not triggered automatically, there are no pre-determined rules framing its nature/size and/or timeline, and the government is not obliged to propose or adopt corrective measures
- other

Please specify:

\*Please give further details in relation to your answer in Q 5.4n:

## SECTION 5b: Independent production/ endorsement of the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts

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\*5b.1 Is there an independent body providing or endorsing the official macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts on which the annual budget is prepared?

- Yes
- No

\*Please specify:

- an independent body providing or endorsing the official macroeconomic AND budgetary forecasts
- an independent body providing or endorsing the official macroeconomic OR budgetary forecasts



\*Please give further details in relation to your answer above (i.e. the name of the body, exact responsibilities):

## SECTION 6: Media visibility of the rule

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\*6.1 Which of the following best describes the degree of media and public awareness of the rule?

- The rule is closely monitored by the media; non-compliance is likely to trigger public debate
- There is high media coverage of the rule, but non-compliance is unlikely to invoke public debate
- No or modest interest of the media

Additional information:

\*6.2 Please describe the degree of media and public awareness of the new rule

- Introduction of the rule was closely covered by the media; there was a public debate
- Introduction of the rule was covered by the media but there was no public debate
- No or modest coverage by the media

Additional information:

## SECTION 7: Compliance with the rule in 2015

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\*7.0 Did the new rule introduced in 2015 have an impact on 2015 budget execution?

- Yes
- No

\*Please specify:

Additional information:

\*7.1 Was the budget law adopted for the budgetary year 2015 compliant with the rule?

- Yes  
 No

\*7.1a Were the escape clauses or flexibility provisions (either national or SGP-related) taken into account?

- Yes  
 No

\*Please specify:

\*7.1b Please give a quantitative assessment of compliance with the rule of the budget law adopted for the budgetary year 2015, consistent with the entries in section 2 on the target definition, unit of measurement, and numerical value of the target: (e.g., in case of a rule prescribing that the cyclically-adjusted general government balance is not higher than 1.5% of GDP, please specify the cyclically-adjusted general government balance defined in the adopted budget law for the budgetary year 2015; in case of a rule prescribing that the growth rate of nominal expenditure does not exceed 1%, please specify the growth rate of nominal expenditure defined in the adopted budget law for the budgetary year 2015 etc.)

Additional information:

\*7.1c If the budget law was not compliant with the rule in 2015, please specify the main reason(s):

\*7.1d Was non-compliance of the budget law with the rule covered by the media?

Additional information:

\*7.2 Was the execution of the budget law 2015 compliant with the rule?

- Yes
- No

\*7.2a Were the escape clauses or flexibility provisions (either national or SGP-related) used?

- Yes
- No

\*Please specify:

Additional information:

\*7.2b Please give a quantitative assessment of compliance with the rule in 2015 by budgetary outcomes, consistent with the entries in section 2 on the target definition, unit of measurement, and numerical value of the target: (e.g., in case of a rule prescribing that the cyclically-adjusted general government balance is not higher than 1.5% of GDP, please specify the cyclically-adjusted general government balance achieved, in case of a rule prescribing that the growth rate of nominal expenditure does not exceed 1%, please specify the growth rate of nominal expenditure achieved etc. ):

\*7.2c If the execution of the budget was not compliant with the rule in 2015, please specify the main reason(s) (multiple replies possible):

- deviation between forecasted GDP and its realization
- unexpected revenue shortfalls due to adverse macro-economic developments
- unexpected revenue shortfalls due to legislative changes
- unexpected mandatory spending obligations (e.g., new or amended legislation)
- unexpected urgent need for discretionary spending (e.g., disaster relief or war)
- unexpected interest increase on existing debt
- other

\*deviation between forecasted GDP and its realization, please specify:

\* unexpected revenue shortfalls due to adverse macro-economic developments, please specify:

\* unexpected revenue shortfalls due to legislative changes, please specify:

\* unexpected mandatory spending obligations (e.g., new or amended legislation), please specify:

\* unexpected urgent need for discretionary spending (e.g., disaster relief or war), please specify:

\* unexpected interest increase on existing debt, please specify:

\* other, please specify:

\*7.3 Please indicate the perceived nature of the constraint defined by the rule in 2015:

e.g. a debt target significantly higher than current debt level

- Compliance with the rule could be achieved easily.
- Compliance with the rule could be achieved with difficulty.

Additional information:

\*7.4 Was non-compliance of the budget execution with the rule well covered by the media?

- Non-compliance with the rule was closely covered by the media; there was a public debate
- Non-compliance with the rule was covered by the media but there was no public debate
- No or modest coverage by the media

Additional information:

\*7.5 Did non-compliance in 2015 have any impact on the 2016 budget preparation? (Please describe potential correction mechanisms, sanctions or corrective measures affecting 2016 budget preparation and any other relevant issues)

- Yes
- No

\*Please specify:

7.6 Was compliance of budget execution with the rule well covered by the media?

- Compliance with the rule was closely covered by the media; there was a public debate
- Compliance with the rule was covered by the media but there was no public debate
- No or modest coverage by the media

Additional information:

## SECTION 8: End of the questionnaire

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\*8.1 Contact details of the respondent: Name, first name, position, department, institution, adress, email, phone number.

8.2 Remarks/ feedback concerning the questionnaire:

## SECTION: Meta Information

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Creation date:

Last update date

\* Identifier of the questionnaire (please do not change this field):