




Liberté • Égalité • Fraternité
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

MINISTÈRE
DES FINANCES
ET DES COMPTES
PUBLICS

MINISTÈRE
DE L'ÉCONOMIE,
DE L'INDUSTRIE
ET DU NUMÉRIQUE




Commitment, openness, team spirit and loyalty

- 1. Public investment suffered during the crisis**
- 2. Investment budget: how can it work?**
- 3. What if it had been implemented at the beginning of the EA?**
- 4. Implications and open questions**

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Public investment suffered to a great extent from the crisis

Figure 5. General Government Expenditure Composition
(Rebased ratio to GDP)



Note: The sample includes 19 EA countries. GDP ratios are rebased using 2007 as base year (= 100).

Source: Eyraud *et. al* 2017

Public investment suffered to a great extent from the crisis

- ▶ The bulk of expenditure consolidation has been driven by reductions in capital spending
- ▶ Countries that have been pressured are more inclined to use investment as adjustment variable
 - ◆ *Less costly politically*
 - ◆ *Institutional constraints*
 - ◆ *Investment is more manageable than pension expenditure or debt charges which are mainly the result of past choices .*

The problem with consolidation through cut in investment

- ▶ An overall review of the literature highlighted a consensus on a positive effect of public investment on growth
 - ◆ *in the short term (via an increase in demand)*
 - ◆ *in the long term (contribution generally positive to the capital stock, but the effects are much less robust to the model specifications).*
 - ◆ *In addition: crowding-in of private investment (cluster effect)*

- ▶ Marien Ferdinandusse (ECB) presented an analysis of public investment in Europe, using a DSGE model (2016 Public Finance Network)
 - ◆ *The way to finance this investment is crucial: the effect is maximal if the investment is financed by public debt (instead increasing revenues or decreasing other expenditures)*

The problem with consolidation through cut in investment (2)

- ▶ In the medium term, fiscal consolidation through cut in public investment could make it harder for the periphery to catch up with the core countries
 - ◆ *With high debt-to-GDP ratios, these countries lack the fiscal space to cope with another recession, while limited public investment capacity threatens to keep productivity sluggish.*
 - ◆ *In parallel, private investment is still at a very low level*

- ▶ These factors are threatening
 - ◆ *entrench structural trends*
 - ◆ *in the long term stifle potential growth in these countries*
 - ◆ *potentially placing euro area cohesion in jeopardy*

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An investment capacity

- ▶ The proposed investment budget would account for at least 2% of euro area GDP and would finance public investment expenditure
- ▶ Creating a euro area investment budget, targeting projects most likely to foster potential growth
 - ◆ *The EU's structural funds were successful at driving convergence in the periphery before these countries joined the single currency.*
 - ◆ *The EU enlargement lead to a decrease of allocations benefiting to Member States at the periphery of the euro area*
- ▶ There is a strong case for dedicating part of the euro area budget to enhance productivity and convergence within the bloc.
 - ◆ *It would also improve macroeconomic stability by preventing massive cuts in public investment during times of crisis (as seen in the euro area since 2010).*
 - ◆ *The funds would be channelled to projects offering the best socioeconomic return, with a particular emphasis on physical capital (especially infrastructure) and human capital (such as R&D, innovation and vocational training)*

Revenues and expenditures

- ▶ The investment budget could be financed by a fixed percentage of two common consolidated tax bases – VAT and corporate tax.
 - ◆ *Around 15% of VAT receipts (or 1 percentage point of GDP from VAT receipts) could be allocated to the investment budget.*
 - ◆ *allocating around 40% of corporation tax receipts to the investment budget could push up the budget by approximately 1 percentage point of GDP*
(Assuming that ongoing negotiations around the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) Directive lead to full harmonisation on corporation tax)

- ▶ The funds would be channelled to projects offering the best socioeconomic return
 - ◆ *particular emphasis on physical capital (especially infrastructure) and human capital (such as R&D, innovation and vocational training).*
 - ◆ *this new stream of permanent investment would kick-start lasting economic convergence in the euro area.*
 - ◆ *It would improve macroeconomic stability by preventing massive cuts in public investment during times of crisis*

Balance

- ▶ The budget's primary goal would be to support permanent public investment

- ▶ In a recession, shaving these tax rates would help to shore up the economy.
 - ◆ *in a similar vein, policy-makers could alternatively respond by stepping up expenditure*

- ▶ Investment capacity would not be constrained by annual balanced budget requirements
 - ◆ *The "revenue" side would be cyclical*
 - ◆ *The "expenditure" side would be a-cyclical or even slightly counter cyclical: it would grow in line with potential growth.*

Balance (2)

- ▶ The euro area investment budget would need a borrowing capacity to make this possible
 - ◆ *The budget would by design, have cyclical revenue streams and stable expenditure*

- ▶ Domestic fiscal rules would have to be tightened and central debt to be offset by a lowered national indebtedness.

- ▶ Ultimately, an investment budget of this type would partially replace government budgets, albeit to a limited extent.
 - ◆ *This could be achieved without increasing the overall tax burden.*
 - ◆ *But shifting part of public investment expenditures from national to central level*
 - ◆ *It would also help maintain permanent, high-quality public investment (in physical and human capital)*

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Simulation: assumptions

- ▶ We simulated how the euro area economy would have behaved if the investment budget had been introduced at the same time as the single currency.
- ▶ We used fiscal multipliers from the Mesange model (developed by DG Trésor and Insee) to assess the impact of budget-linked countercyclical fiscal stimulus measures.
- ▶ We considered that fiscal multipliers would be higher during a severe crisis episode.
 - ◆ *In accordance with the literature, we assumed that recessions reduce potential growth when they have a long-lasting effect on economic activity.*
 - ◆ *In our model, "severe crisis" designates any period when the euro area output gap falls below -1.5% .*

Simulation: impact on GDP

- ▶ Up to and including 2007, the impact of the investment budget would have been limited.
 - ◆ *No severe crisis episodes in the euro area between 1999 and 2007*
 - ◆ *On the contrary, Member States would have further reduced their sovereign debt burden during this period, because of the tougher domestic fiscal rules.*
 - ◆ *thanks to additional efforts, the euro area aggregated public deficit would have been lower*

- ▶ From 2008 onwards, however, the investment budget would have had a much greater impact
 - ◆ *tax relief measures reserved for severe crisis episodes - would have been triggered.*
 - ◆ *remain in force each year between 2009 and 2015 (with the exception of 2011).*
 - ◆ *investment budget would have cut the VAT levied in Member States*
 - ◆ *fiscal expansion of almost 1 GDP point a year during this period.*

Simulation: impact on GDP (2)


- ▶ During crisis Member States would have been exempted from applying further fiscal consolidation measures
 - ◆ *the exceptional crisis-related clause built into tighter domestic rules would have been triggered*
 - ◆ *Member States would even have contributed to the fiscal stimulus.*
 - ◆ *aggregated euro area budget balance more expansionist than what has been observed by 1.4 percentage points of GDP each year of the period 2009-2015*

- ▶ Higher level of GDP by 3 percentage points higher in 2016.

- ▶ The effect could be even more important:
 - ◆ *The simulation does not fully account for the contribution of smoother cyclical fluctuations (particularly on investor confidence).*
 - ◆ *the impact of lower pre-crisis debt levels on interest rates is not considered*
 - ◆ *simulation looks at aggregate effects only*

Simulation: impact on GDP (3)

Chart 7: Result of our simulation
(base 100 = 2000)




Source: AMECO, DG Trésor calculations.

Simulation: Balance

- ▶ Debt associated with the investment budget would have risen during the period, rising from around 0% in 1999-2008 to 7% in 2016.
 - ◆ *this additional burden would have been offset by the decline of Member States' debt-to-GDP ratio, which is spread over a longer period of time.*
 - ◆ *total debt across the euro area would have been just 2% higher in 2016*
 - ◆ *additional debt would have been wiped out by 2018.*


- ▶ In our simulation, the euro area would then have had the same debt-to-GDP ratio as it has now

Simulation: Balance (2)



Simulation: Balance (3)

Chart 8: Budget balance and additional debt associated with the investment budget of the euro area (as a percent of the GDP of the euro area)




Source: AMECO, DG Trésor calculations.

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A coherent architecture for the EA

Evolution of the euro area architecture: key proposals



Significant evolution of EA governance needed

▶ Euro area Finance Minister

- ◆ *could oversee, under the new governance structure, the euro area budget – including revenue and expenditure planning*
- ◆ *setting the euro area aggregate fiscal stance*
- ◆ *overseeing the MIP, monitoring the euro area financial sector (in tandem with the SSM and the SRM)*
- ◆ *determining and overseeing financial assistance and crisis management programmes (via the ESM enshrined in EU law)*
- ◆ *in the long run, representing the euro area to international financial institutions.*

▶ « Euro area Parliament » (to be defined) would be associated with these decisions

▶ Budgetary acts would be submitted for adoption by the Eurogroup

Open questions

- ▶ **Physical / Human capital investment?**
- ▶ **What to do in the short run?**
- ▶ **Which conditions? Which transition process?**

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