

Future-proofing fiscal policies: Caution and robustness

DG-EcFinAnnual Research Conference

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Brussels, 15 November 2019

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Twobasic principles I want to keep in mind

1. It's great to know what optimal policy is - whether monetary, fiscal or other areas of policy


- Yet it alwaysdepends on the view taken how the economyworks, the model used, the uncertainties and risks considered, ...
- Instead, an alternative to search for and consider (simple) rules that are robust, that is, rules that deliver reasonablygood performance across a range of "world" views and set boundaries to avoid worst-case outcomes.

2. It's good to know whether a central authority would be better at running fiscal policy.


- Yet, EU/euro area is a union of sovereign member states held together by treaties. And budgets, taxation and expenditures are central to providing a basis for national political decision making.
- Thus, unless steps towards political union come first, some potential benefits of centralization cannot be realized.

Recent history: Debt to GDP ratios and interest rates can rise sharply and unexpectedly

General government gross debt to GDP ratio 2000 - 2018



10-year government bond yields



Source: Eurostat

Long-term interest rates very low in recent years

Reasons


- Monetary policy: forward guidance and quantitative easing
- Decline in medium- or long-term equilibrium interest rates: savings glut/ safe assets demand

Fiscal consequences

- Vey large interest cost savings, lock-in of low long-term rates
- Debt -GDP ratios stabilized at high levels, in a few cases decline towards or below 60% limit

How long will this situation persist?

Estimates of (medium-run) equilibrium real rate for Germany



Beyer and Wieland (2019, updated): Laubach-Williams /Garnier-Wilhelmsen methodology


Reversal risk of r<g: Non-trivial from a historical perspective

Reversal probability of the interest rate-growth differential in the historical perspective

Conditional		1	.870-201	6		1946-2016						
probability in %: r>(ĝ+n)	Germany	France	Italy	Spain	Average	Germany	France	Italy	Spain	Average		
Scenario 1												
in 5 years	12.8	11.6	30.8	9.5	16.2	10.6	8.3	34.6	5.7	14.8		
in 10 years	30.3	30.5	47.1	24.9	33.2	36.4	38.0	57.7	31.1	40.8		
Scenario 2												
in 5 years	44.5	44.3	66.2	40.8	49.0	40.8	38.0	70.1	31.6	45.1		
in 10 years	50.6	52.1	68.0	48.3	54.7	54.5	56.4	76.9	50.4	59.5		


Sources: Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database, Jordà et al. (2019), IWF, Refinitiv Datastream, own calculations

Where we stand in terms of monetary policy: Euro area output gap and inflation measures



Taylor rule translates output and inflation gap into interest rate prescription

Taylor rule with different inflation measures




Rule shown with $r^*=2\%$

Prescription at or near zero with $r^*=-1$


→ Current ECB policy is already very accommodative, even considering low r*

Further easing is possible: negative rates, QE (corporate bonds, stocks, ..).

Fiscal stimulus and spillovers at zero bound: Simulation of German EERP stimulus in 2 region model



Public consumption¹ Public investment¹




rest of the euro area²

in Germany²

Zero lower bound binding for 8 quarters

Can national fiscal stabilization policy make up for loss of monetary policy?



Flexible exchange rate

- Monetary union
- Fixed exchange rate (unilateral peg)
- • Monetary union with countercyclical transfers

Estimate two regions model of euro area

Region A: countries that typically devalued vs D-Mark prior to EMU.

Region D: countries that maintained stable exchange rate vs D-Mark

Asymmetric shock in region Aunder four different regimes:

flexible exchange rate, unilateral peg, EMU, EMU & national stabilization policy (transfers)

EMU & national countercyclical fiscal policy regime comes close to stabilization under flexible rate regime

Standard deviation of output gap, inflation and budget balance¹

%

	Outpu	ut gap	Infla	ation	Budget balance	
	Region A ²	Region D ³	Region A ²	Region D ³	Region A ²	Region D ³
Flexible exchange rate ⁴	2.38	2.61	0.96	0.70	0	0
Fixed exchange rate (unilateral peg) ⁵	4.73	2.68	1.12	0.63	0	0
Monetary union	3.05	3.77	0.96	0.71	0	0
Monetary union with countercyclical transfer payments ⁶	2.46	2.92	0.91	0.67	0.83	1.02

Central fiscal capacity could lead to persistent net transfers across countries (calculation with historical data)

Cumulative net transfers to the twelve euro area member states as part of a fiscal capacity %


		AT	BE	DE	ES	FI	FR	GR	IE	IT	LU	NL	PT
Arnold et al. (2018) ²	1990 – 2017	- 2.8	- 3.1	- 0.7	20.7	3.5	- 1.4	29.0	5.8	3.3	0.1	- 1.1	9.0
Arnold et al. (2018) ²	1970 – 2017	- 2.6	- 0.8	0.7	25.2	3.3	0.7	30.8	7.3	4.2	0.3	0.6	10.0
Beetsma et al. (2018)	1995 – 2014	- 0.1	- 1.2	0.2	0.1	2.3	- 0.3	1.7	- 5.5	1.1	- 10.9	- 0.9	1.6


1 – As a percentage of nominal GDP. Time period under investigation determined by availability of data. AT-Austria, BE-Belgium, DE-Germany, ES-Spain, FI-Finland, FR-France, GR-Greece, IE-Ireland, IT-Italy, LU-Luxembourg, NL-Netherlands, PT-Portugal. 2 – Proposal of the International Monetary Fund. Cumulative payouts at the start of each year. Based on the assumption that the fiscal capacity can borrow and lend money on an interest-free basis..

Sources: European Commission, OECD, own calculations

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Fiscal rule exceptions





1 - Analysis based on reported figures in the Assessments of the Stability Programmes by the EU Commission. 2 - Exemptions for refugees, security-related measures and natural desasters constitute the exemptions for unsual events. 3 - No size figures are reported by the European Commission in case of the exemptions for adverse economic conditions and small deviations. 4 - Reported size refers to a single observation.

GCEE has a modest proposal for re-focusing the fiscal rules: An expenditure rule with adjustment account

Elements of a reformed expenditure rule

