

Independent Fiscal Institutions in the EU Member States in 2016

| Fields marked with * are mandatory. | |
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| SECTION 1: Developments in 2016 | |
| *1.1 Please choose from: The fiscal institution was created in 2016 The fiscal institution was created before 2016 but never report The fiscal institution remained UNCHANGED in 2016 The fiscal institution was REFORMED in 2016 Additional information: | orted |
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| *1.2 Please indicate the date the reform entered into force (MM/Y) | /): |
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*1.3 Please indicate the main reasons for the reform of the fiscal institution:

| *1.4 Did the reform affect any of the areas below? (multiple replies possible) Independence of the IFI (statutory base, funding arrangements, nomination and/or responsibilities of board members) Activities/tasks of the IFI Designation of the fiscal institution |
|---|
| Other |
| *"Independence of the IFI", please specify: |
| *"Activities/tasks of the IFI", please specify: |
| *"Designation of the fiscal institution", please specify: |
| *"Other", please specify: |
| SECTION 2: General description of the fiscal institution |
| *2.1 Please indicate the official name of the fiscal institution in the language of your country: |
| *2.2 Please indicate the official abbreviation of the name of the fiscal institution in the language of your country: |
| 2.3 Please indicate the official name of the fiscal institution in English (if available): |

| 2.4 Please indicate the official abbreviation of the name of the fiscal institution in English (if available): |
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| *2.5 Please indicate the date when the legislation establishing the fiscal institution was approved (MM/YY): |
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| *2.6 Please indicate the date when the fiscal institution started operating (MM/YY): |
| 2.0 Flease indicate the date when the fiscal institution started operating (wild) 11). |
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| Additional information: |
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| *2.7 Please provide a general description of the fiscal institution: |
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| SECTION 3: Independence of the fiscal institution |
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| *3.1 Please indicate which legal document(s) establishes the fiscal institution: |
| the constitution |
| an organic law or other form of reinforced law |
| an ordinary law |
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| a parliament decision |
| O other |
| |
| *other, please specify |
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| Additional information: |
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| *3.2 Please provide the title of the above legal document and, if relevant, its articles referring to the fiscal institution: |
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| *3.3 Please specify on the status of the fiscal institution: It is a stand-alone body (not functionally attached to another institution) It is functionally attached to another body Other |
| * Please specify which body: |
| *Other, please specify: |
| Additional information |
| *3.4 If functionally attached, please describe what kind of support is provided by the host institution (for example in terms of IT systems, buildings, human resource management, communication services, budget integration etc.) |
| |
| *3.5 Are the implementing provisions governing the organisation and functioning of the fiscal institution grounded in national law, regulation or binding administrative provisions? O Yes No |
| Additional information: |
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| *3.6 Please provide a reference to these legal documents. |
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| *3.7 Please indicate who prepares the annual work program of the fiscal institution: |
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| *3.8 Has the fiscal institution the freedom to communicate publicly without any interference from other bodies? |
| Yes, on fixed dates |
| Yes, at any time |
| O No |
| *No, please specify: |
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| Additional information: |
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| 3.9 Is the fiscal institution allowed to enter into contractual agreements with other entities/persons in order |
| to draw additional/more specialised expertise (i.e. can it delegate some of its work)? |
| YesNo |
| O NO |
| *Yes, please specify: |
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| Additional information: |
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| *3.10 Does the fiscal institution have access to draft budgets and medium-term planning documents before they are publicly available? |
| Yes |
| O No |
| Additional information: |
| Additional information: |
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| *3.11 To what extent does the fiscal institution have access to non-public information allowing it to perform its tasks (multiple choice question)? (Please pick only one option from A1 to A3) |
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| A1: it has full access to inside information in public administration, and public bodies have to |
| respond to its requests A2: it has a privileged but limited access (in scope or in time) to information in public administration |
| A3: it has access to internal documents pertaining to the preparation of the annual budget |
| it has access to internal budgetary information on the budget execution it has access to non-public datasets for in-depth budget analysis |
| it has no privileged access to inside information |
| other |
| *Other, please specify: |
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| Additional information: |
| Additional information. |
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| *3.12 Please indicate the total amount of the 2016 budget of the fiscal institution (in million EUR): |
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| *3.13 Please describe the funding arrangements of the fiscal institution: |
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| *3.14 Is this funding mechanism grounded in national law? (regulation, administrative rules, other legal documents) |
| © Yes |
| O No |
| *Yes, please specify: |
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| Additional information: |
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| *3.15 Are there any other procedures ensuring that the fiscal institution enjoys a degree of stability in its |
| funding over the medium-term? © Yes |
| No |
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| * Yes, please specify: |
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| Additional information: |
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| *3.16 Does the fiscal institution have access to other sources of financing than the direct funding by the |
| public sector? O Yes |
| YesNo |
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| Additional information: |
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| *3.17 What was in 2016 the proportion of the functioning costs of the fiscal institution that was not covered by the public sector direct funding (in %)? |
| by the public sector direct runding (iii 78): |
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| Additional information: |
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| *3.18 Please specify the size (i.e. number of members) of the governing/high-level board of the fiscal |
| institution: |
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| *3.19 Please specify the composition of the governing/high-level board of the fiscal institution: |
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| Additional information: |
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| *3.20 Please describe the nomination and appointment procedures of the governing/high-level board members of the fiscal institution: |
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| *3.21 Is the selection procedure of governing/high-level members of the fiscal institution enshrined in a legally binding document (e.g. in the document setting its statutory regime)? Yes No |
| Additional information: |
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| *3.22 What are the required conditions in terms of experience and competences of the potential governing /high-level members of the fiscal institution? |
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| *3.23 Please specify the number of years of the terms of office of governing/high-level board members of the fiscal institution: |
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| *3.23.1 Are the mandates of the governing/high-level board members renewable? O Yes No |

| Additional information: |
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| *3.23.2 How many times can the mandates be renewed? Once 2 times 3 times More than 3 times |
| Additional information: |
| *3.24 Do the terms of office of the governing/high-level board members of the fiscal institution by default start and end simultaneously? Yes No Additional information: |
| Additional information. |
| *3.25 If not, please describe the staggered terms: |
| |
| *3.26.1 Are the governing/high-level members of the fiscal institution permitted to hold public administration positions during their terms of office? O Yes No |
| Additional information: |
| *3.27 Are there other constraints/limitations? O Yes No |

| Additional information: |
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| *3.28 Please specify how the governing/high level board of the fiscal institution adopts decisions and/or |
| releases opinions: |
| by consensus |
| by qualified majority |
| by (simple) majority |
| O other |
| othor |
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| * Other, please specify: |
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| Additional information: |
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| *3.29 Is there a chairman/president of the fiscal institution? |
| O Yes |
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| O No |
| ○ No |
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| No Additional information: |
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| Additional information: |
| Additional information: *3.30 What are the powers of the chairman/president in relation to the governing/high-level board and the |
| Additional information: *3.30 What are the powers of the chairman/president in relation to the governing/high-level board and the |
| Additional information: *3.30 What are the powers of the chairman/president in relation to the governing/high-level board and the |

| Additional information: |
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| *3.31 Apart from the governing board, please specify the approximate size of staff employed by the fiscal institution, in terms of full-time jobs, differentiating between e.g. economic researchers and administrative staff: |
| |
| *3.32 Please describe the selection and appointment procedure of the staff of the fiscal institution: |
| |
| SECTION 4: Activities of the fiscal institution |
| *4.1 Please specify the fields of activity of the fiscal institution according to its mandate: it is limited to fiscal policy it also covers other areas of economic analysis |
| Additional information: |
| *4.2 Please specify the areas of economic analysis of the fiscal institution other than fiscal policy (multiple choice question): macroeconomics industrial organisation/competition international economics, trade sectoral and/or regional economic activity financial markets |
| environment and climate labour economics incl. migration other * other, please specify: |
| otilei, piease specily. |

| Additional information: |
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| *4.3 In the field of fiscal policy, please indicate the tasks fulfilled by the fiscal institution (multiple choice |
| question): |
| Monitoring of compliance with numerical fiscal rules |
| Production/endorsement/assessment of macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts |
| Provision of analysis on fiscal policy developments |
| Issuing normative statements/recommendations regarding fiscal policy |
| Long-term sustainability assessment, taking into account demographic changes |
| Quantification of short-term and long-term budgetary effects of envisaged policy measures and reforms |
| Active promotion of fiscal transparency (e.g. by examining the clarity of the budget bills; screening the legislation/fiscal documentation to make it more accessible and clear; etc.) Other tasks |
| *Provision of analysis on fiscal policy developments, please specify: |
| *Long-term sustainability assessment taking into account demographic changes, please specify: |
| Long-term sustainability assessment taking into account demographic changes, please specify. |
| |
| *Quantification of short-term and long-term budgetary effects of envisaged policy measures and reforms, please specify: |
| |
| *Active promotion of fiscal transparency, please provide examples of initiatives you have taken over the last year to improve the transparency of public finances? (Please note that this question does not cover the transparency of your institution.) |
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| *Other tasks, please specify: |
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| Additional information: |
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| *4.3.1 The IFI involvement in "Monitoring/assessment of compliance with numerical fiscal rules", is: performed according to its official mandate |
| performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output |
| performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output (e.g. ad-hoc reports) |
| *4.3.2 The IFI involvement in "Production/endorsement/assessment of macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts", is: |
| performed according to its official mandate |
| performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output |
| performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output (e.g. ad-hoc reports) |
| *4.3.3 The IFI involvement in "Provision of analysis on fiscal policy developments", is: |
| performed according to its official mandate |
| performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output |
| performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output (e.g. ad-hoc reports) |
| *4.3.4 The IFI involvement in "Issuing normative statements/recommendations regarding fiscal policy", is |
| performed according to its official mandate |
| performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output |
| performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output (e.g. ad-hoc reports) |
| *4.3.5 The IFI involvement in "Long-term sustainability assessment", is: |
| performed according to its official mandate |
| performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output |
| performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output (e.g. ad-hoc reports) |
| *4.3.6 The IFI involvement in "Quantification of short-term and long-term budgetary effects of envisaged policy measures and reforms", is: |
| performed according to its official mandate |
| performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output |
| performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output (e.g. ad-hoc reports) |

| *4.3.7 The IFI involvement in "Promotion of fiscal transparency", is: performed according to its official mandate performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output (e.g. ad-hoc reports) |
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| SECTION 5: Fiscal institution monitoring compliance with numerical fiscal rules |
| *5.0 Please indicate when the assessment of the numerical fiscal rules is undertaken (multiple-choice question): Ex ante public assessment of compliance with fiscal rules (i.e. assessment published before the relevant budgetary document is adopted) Ex post public assessment of compliance with fiscal rules |
| *Please include the link to the latest ex ante assessment: |
| *Please include the link to the latest ex post assessment: |
| *5.0.1 The ex ante assessment, is: performed according to its official mandate performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output (e.g. ad-hoc reports) |
| *5.0.2 The ex post assessment, is: performed according to its official mandate performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output (e.g. ad-hoc reports) |
| *5.1 Are all national numerical fiscal rules monitored by the independent fiscal institution? O Yes No |
| *5.1.1 Are all national numerical fiscal rules at the general government level monitored by the independent fiscal institution? O Yes No |
| *Please indicate which rules at the general government level are monitored: |

| *5.2 Please indicate the number of national numerical fiscal rules concerning which the independent fiscal institution carries out compliance assessment: 1 2 3 4 5 more than 5 |
|---|
| *Rule 1: Please provide a general description of the rule. |
| *Rule 1: Please select the type of rule: Expenditure rule Budget balance rule Revenue rule Debt rule |
| *Rule 1: Are all sectors of the general government covered by the rule? (Please note that for the purpose of this questionnaire we refer to the following sectors of the general government - central government, regional/state government, local government and social security. The questionnaire takes into account that some Member States may not have all of the sectors - in particular regional/state governments.) Yes No |
| *Rule 1: Please indicate the sector(s) of general government covered by the rule (multiple replies possible): local government regional government (autonomous regions or federated states) central government social security other |
| *Other, please specify: |
| |

| *Rule 1: Please indicate the estimated value of items covered by the rule as a percentage of general government expenditure (taking into account exclusions, if any): (in case of revenue rules, please indicate the estimated value as % of general government revenue) |
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| more than 90% |
| © 70% - 90% |
| © 50% - 70% |
| less than 50% |
| * Dula Or Diagon provide a general description of the mula |
| *Rule 2: Please provide a general description of the rule. |
| |
| *Rule 2: Please select the type of rule: |
| Expenditure rule |
| Budget balance rule |
| Revenue rule |
| Debt rule |
| *Rule 2: Are all sectors of the general government covered by the rule? (Please note that for the purpose of this questionnaire we refer to the following sectors of the general government - central government, regional/state government, local government and social security. The questionnaire takes into account that some Member States may not have all of the sectors - in particular regional/state governments.) Yes No |
| *Rule 2: Please indicate the sector(s) of general government covered by the rule (multiple replies possible): local government |
| regional government (autonomous regions or federated states) |
| central government |
| social security |
| other |
| *Other, please specify: |
| |
| *Rule 2: Please indicate the estimated value of items covered by the rule as a percentage of general |
| government expenditure (taking into account exclusions, if any): (in case of revenue rules, please indicate |
| the estimated value as % of general government revenue) |
| more than 90% |
| 0 70% - 90% |
| © 50% - 70% |
| less than 50% |

| *Rule 3: Please provide a general description of the rule. |
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| |
| *Rule 3: Please select the type of rule: Expenditure rule Budget balance rule Revenue rule Debt rule |
| *Rule 3: Are all sectors of the general government covered by the rule? (Please note that for the purpose of this questionnaire we refer to the following sectors of the general government - central government, regional/state government, local government and social security. The questionnaire takes into account that some Member States may not have all of the sectors - in particular regional/state governments.) Yes No |
| *Rule 3: Please indicate the sector(s) of general government covered by the rule (multiple replies possible) local government regional government (autonomous regions or federated states) central government social security other |
| *Other, please specify: |
| *Rule 3: Please indicate the estimated value of items covered by the rule as a percentage of general government expenditure (taking into account exclusions, if any): (in case of revenue rules, please indicate the estimated value as % of general government revenue) more than 90% 70% - 90% 50% - 70% less than 50% |
| *Rule 4: Please provide a general description of the rule. |

| of this questionnaire we refer to the following sectors of the general government - central government, regional/state government, local government and social security. The questionnaire takes into account that some Member States may not have all of the sectors - in particular regional/state governments.) Yes No |
|---|
| *Rule 5: Please indicate the sector(s) of general government covered by the rule (multiple replies possible): local government regional government (autonomous regions or federated states) central government social security other |
| *Other, please specify: |
| |
| *Rule 5: Please indicate the estimated value of items covered by the rule as a percentage of general government expenditure (taking into account exclusions, if any): (in case of revenue rules, please indicate the estimated value as % of general government revenue) more than 90% 70% - 90% 50% - 70% less than 50% |
| *Other monitored rules: Similarly to the 5 rules indicated above, please list all other rules monitored by the independent fiscal institution. For each rule: 1. provide a general description; 2. mention its type; 3. targeted sector(s); 4. coverage in % of general government. |
| |

| *5.3 Please list other numerical fiscal rules which are NOT monitored by the independent fiscal institution. Similarly to the rules indicated above, for each rule please: 1. provide a general description; 2. mention its type, 3. targeted sector(s), 4. coverage in % of general government. |
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| |
| *5.4 Please indicate at which point of budgetary cycle monitoring/ assessment of compliance with numerical fiscal rules is carried out (multiple choice question). If not simultaneous for all monitored rules, please give additional details. In the preparatory stage of the annual budget During the budget execution Once per year More than once per year, at a regular frequency in connection with key stages of the annual budget cycle More than once per year, at any time Other |
| * If more than once per year, at a regular frequency in connection with key stages of the annual budget cycle, please specify: |
| *Other, please specify: |
| Additional information: |
| *5.5 Is the assessment of compliance with fiscal rules publicly available? If different approach applies to various rules, please select "mixed approach" option. Yes No Mixed approach |
| *Please indicate the link to the relevant report(s): |

| *Mixed approach, please specify |
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| Additional information: |
| |
| *5.6 Does the assessment of compliance include an opinion on whether applicable escape clauses should be triggered/extended/exited? If different approach applies to various rules, please select "mixed approach" option. |
| © No |
| Mixed approach |
| |
| *Mixed approach, please specify |
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| |
| Additional information: |
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| *5.7 Is your institution involved in the correction mechanism of your country's main fiscal rule(s) (for instance the Fiscal Compact rule if in force)? Yes |
| © No |
| *Please explain |
| |
| *5.8 Please describe the reaction of the government in relation to the assessment of compliance with |
| national numerical fiscal rules. If different approach applies to various rules, please give additional |
| information. |
| The government has to take corrective steps |
| The government does not have to take corrective steps but it has to publicly explain why it does not take action |
| The government does not have to react, but it usually does |
| The government does not have to react, and it usually does notOther |

| Additional information: |
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| SECTION 6: Fiscal institutions producing/endorsing/assessing forecasts of macroeconomic and/or budgetary variables |
| *6.1 Please indicate the type of forecasts produced/endorsed/assessed by the fiscal institution (multiple choice question): Macroeconomic forecasts Budgetary forecasts Additional information: |
| |
| *6.2a Does the fiscal institution prepare/endorse/assess macroeconomic forecasts for the general government as a whole? O Yes No |
| *6.2b Does the fiscal institution prepare/endorse/assess budgetary forecasts for the general government as a whole? O Yes No |
| Additional information: |
| |

| *6.3 Apart from the general government sector, please specify the sub-sectors of general government for which forecasts are prepared/endorsed/assessed by the fiscal institution (multiple choice question): Central government Regional government Local government Social security Other |
|--|
| *Other, please specify: |
| Additional information: |
| |
| *6.4 With regard to macroeconomic forecasts, please indicate which of the following tasks is fulfilled by your institution (the question refers both to mandatory and optional tasks): Production of macro-economic forecasts used for fiscal planning (within the meaning of Art. 2.1b of the Two-Pack Regulation 473/2013) Production of macro-economic forecasts, but these are not used for the national fiscal planning Official endorsement of the government's macroeconomic forecasts used for fiscal planning (within the meaning of Art. 2.1b of the Two-Pack Regulation 473/2013) Assessment of the official macroeconomic forecasts which is published before submission to the Parliament of the budgetary planning documents The fiscal institution is consulted at the start or during the preparation of macroeconomic forecasts Other |
| * Please specify: The fiscal institution produces the forecasts in-house |
| The fiscal institution sub-contracts the production of the forecasts to another entity but retains ultimate responsibility for their delivery |
| *Other, please specify: |
| |
| *6.4.1 Production/ endorsement/ assessment of macro-economic forecasts is: performed according to its official mandate performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output |

| the official submission of the IFI opinion) |
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| Note: "Reconciliation procedure" refers to arrangements set out in writing on the steps to be taken should there |
| be diverging views, on the forecasts, between the government and the endorser. |
| O Yes |
| No, but informal contacts take place |
| No, the government would just proceed with their own projections as informal contacts already |
| took place before the submission of forecasts |
| No, the government would just proceed with their own projections |
| Other |
| Not applicable |
| |
| *Please mention the name of the document framing the reconciliation procedure: |
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| |
| *Please specify: |
| leade speeny. |
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| Additional information: |
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| *6.5 Please indicate the role of the forecasts of macroeconomic variables for the preparation of the annual |
| budget: |
| budget: there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts |
| budget: there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts there is a political agreement that the fiscal institution's forecasts are generally used |
| budget: there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts there is a political agreement that the fiscal institution's forecasts are generally used the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts |
| budget: there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts there is a political agreement that the fiscal institution's forecasts are generally used the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts have to be justified publicly |
| budget: there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts there is a political agreement that the fiscal institution's forecasts are generally used the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts have to be justified publicly the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for |
| budget: there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts there is a political agreement that the fiscal institution's forecasts are generally used the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts have to be justified publicly the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts |
| budget: there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts there is a political agreement that the fiscal institution's forecasts are generally used the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts have to be justified publicly the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for |
| there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts there is a political agreement that the fiscal institution's forecasts are generally used the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts have to be justified publicly the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts Other |
| budget: there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts there is a political agreement that the fiscal institution's forecasts are generally used the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts have to be justified publicly the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts |
| there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts there is a political agreement that the fiscal institution's forecasts are generally used the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts have to be justified publicly the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts Other |
| there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts there is a political agreement that the fiscal institution's forecasts are generally used the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts have to be justified publicly the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts Other |
| there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts there is a political agreement that the fiscal institution's forecasts are generally used the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts have to be justified publicly the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts Other |
| there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts there is a political agreement that the fiscal institution's forecasts are generally used the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts have to be justified publicly the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts Other |
| budget: there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts there is a political agreement that the fiscal institution's forecasts are generally used the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts have to be justified publicly the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts Other *Other *Other, please specify: |
| budget: there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts there is a political agreement that the fiscal institution's forecasts are generally used the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts have to be justified publicly the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts Other *Other *Other, please specify: |

*6.4.2 When endorsing macroeconomic forecasts is there a reconciliation procedure in place? (Following

| the fiscal institution (multiple choice question): government expenditures based on policy measures announced in specific documents (e.g. budget law or specific economic policy decisions) government revenues government balance government debt other |
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| |
| Additional information: |
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| *6.7 With regard to budgetary forecasts, which of the following tasks is fulfilled by your institution (the question refers both to mandatory and optional tasks): Production of the official budgetary forecasts Production of budgetary forecasts, but these are not used for the national fiscal planning Official endorsement of the government's budgetary forecasts (within the meaning of Art. 4.4 of the Two-Pack Regulation 473/2013) Assessment of budgetary forecasts BEFORE the adoption in the Parliament of the budgetary planning documents Assessment of the budgetary forecasts AFTER the adoption in the Parliament of the budgetary planning documents The fiscal institution is consulted at the start or during the preparation of budgetary forecasts Other |
| * Please specify: The fiscal institution produces the forecasts in-house The fiscal institution sub-contracts the production of the forecasts to another entity but retains ultimate responsibility for their delivery |
| * Other, please specify: |
| |
| *6.7.1 Production/ endorsement/ assessment of budgetary forecasts is: performed according to its official mandate performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output |

| *6.7.2 Is your opinion based on quantitative policy costing (numerical quantification/certification of budgetary impacts of all or selected envisaged policy measures): Yes |
|---|
| O No |
| *Please specify: |
| |
| Additional information: |
| |
| 6.8 Please, indicate the role of the forecasts of budgetary variables for the preparation of the annual budget |
| there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts there is a political agreement that the fiscal institution's forecasts are generally used |
| there is a political agreement that the liscal institution's forecasts are generally used the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts have to be justified publicly |
| the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts other |
| *Other, please specify: |
| |
| Additional information: |
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| *6.9 Please describe the involvement of the fiscal institution in the initial preparation stage of the forecasts and also in the stage when forecasts are updated: |
| |
| *6.10a Does the fiscal institution provide an ex-post evaluation of macroeconomic forecasts? © Yes © No |

| *Please specify: |
|---|
| |
| |
| |
| *6.10b Does the fiscal institution provide an ex-post evaluation of budgetary forecasts? © Yes |
| O No |
| *Please specify: |
| |
| |
| |
| Additional information: |
| |
| |
| *6.11 Does the fiscal institution provide macroeconomic and/or budgetary long-term projections? |
| YesNo |
| to (O.W.) (1 |
| *6.12 What sorts of long-term projections are provided, how often and for what purposes? |
| |
| |
| *6.13 Please specify the time horizon of the long-term projections (number of years): |
| |
| |
| |
| Additional information: |
| |
| |

| MTBF planning document (i.e. the medium-term plans): |
|---|
| |
| |
| *6.15 Please specify whether the macroeconomic forecasts produced/endorsed by the fiscal institution are |
| used in the MTBF planning document (i.e. the medium-term plans) |
| YesNo |
| O NO |
| Additional information: |
| |
| |
| *6.16 Please specify whether the budgetary forecasts produced/endorsed by the fiscal institution are used |
| in the MTBF planning document (i.e. the medium-term plans) Output Description: |
| O No |
| Additional information: |
| |
| |
| |
| Section 7: Fiscal institutions issuing normative statements |
| /recommendations |
| *7.1 Please indicate the activities of the fiscal institution in the area of issuing normative statements |
| and recommendations (multiple choice question): normative assessment of the draft government budget |
| recommendations on changes of fiscal policy measures specified in the draft government budget |
| normative assessment/monitoring in the implementation stage of the budget recommendations on changes of fiscal policy measures in the implementation stage of the budget |
| normative assessment of economic programmes of political parties ahead of elections |
| other |
| *Please specify: |
| |
| |
| |

| Additional information: |
|--|
| |
| |
| 7.2 Please specify the way in which the government interacts with the fiscal institution in the planning stage of the budgetary process: the government is obliged by law to consult the fiscal institution the government generally consults the fiscal institution, though not obliged by law the government does not consult the fiscal institution Other |
| *Please specify: |
| |
| Additional information: |
| |
| *7.3 Please specify the way in which the parliament interacts with the fiscal institution in the planning stage of the budgetary process: the fiscal institution has to be auditioned by the parliament (legal obligation) |
| the fiscal institution is generally auditioned by the parliament, though there is no such legal obligation |
| there is no formal consultation of the fiscal institution by the parliamentother |
| *Please specify: |
| |
| Additional information: |
| |

| *7.4 Please specify if the fiscal institution provides normative assessment/recommendations of the draft government budget in terms of the following (multiple choice question): consistency with sustainable government finances adequacy in the prevailing cyclical conditions / appropriateness in terms of stabilisation compliance with the requirements of the SGP compliance with the budgetary targets established in the MTBF/SCP framework compliance with the national fiscal rules quality of government finances, e.g. in terms composition of revenue and expenditure other |
|--|
| *Please specify: |
| |
| Additional information: |
| |
| *7.5 How does the government react to the normative assessment/recommendations of the draft government budget provided by the fiscal institution? it is obliged by law to follow recommendations or explain why it does not follow it is obliged by law to react to the normative assessment of the draft budget though not obliged by law, the government typically reacts (follows recommendations or explains the deviations, discusses the assessment etc) it generally does not react other |
| *Please specify: |
| Additional information: |
| |
| |

| stage of the budget in terms of the following (multiple choice question): |
|---|
| implementation of the budget law in general, including alert in case of substantial deviations from |
| plans |
| consistency with sustainable government finances |
| adequacy in the prevailing cyclical conditions / appropriateness in terms of stabilisation compliance with the requirements of the SGP |
| compliance with the budgetary targets established in the MTBF/SCP framework |
| compliance with the national fiscal rules |
| quality of government finances, e.g. in terms of composition of revenue and expenditure |
| other |
| *Please specify: |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Additional information: |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| *7.7 How does the government react to the normative assessment/monitoring provided by the fiscal institution at the implementation stage of the budget? |
| institution at the implementation stage of the budget? |
| |
| institution at the implementation stage of the budget? it is obliged by law to react to the normative assessment though not obliged by law, the government typically reacts (follows recommendations or explains the deviations, discusses the assessment etc) |
| institution at the implementation stage of the budget? it is obliged by law to react to the normative assessment though not obliged by law, the government typically reacts (follows recommendations or explains the deviations, discusses the assessment etc) it generally does not react |
| institution at the implementation stage of the budget? it is obliged by law to react to the normative assessment though not obliged by law, the government typically reacts (follows recommendations or explains the deviations, discusses the assessment etc) |
| institution at the implementation stage of the budget? it is obliged by law to react to the normative assessment though not obliged by law, the government typically reacts (follows recommendations or explains the deviations, discusses the assessment etc) it generally does not react |
| institution at the implementation stage of the budget? it is obliged by law to react to the normative assessment though not obliged by law, the government typically reacts (follows recommendations or explains the deviations, discusses the assessment etc) it generally does not react other |
| institution at the implementation stage of the budget? it is obliged by law to react to the normative assessment though not obliged by law, the government typically reacts (follows recommendations or explains the deviations, discusses the assessment etc) it generally does not react other |
| institution at the implementation stage of the budget? it is obliged by law to react to the normative assessment though not obliged by law, the government typically reacts (follows recommendations or explains the deviations, discusses the assessment etc) it generally does not react other |
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| institution at the implementation stage of the budget? it is obliged by law to react to the normative assessment though not obliged by law, the government typically reacts (follows recommendations or explains the deviations, discusses the assessment etc) it generally does not react other |
| institution at the implementation stage of the budget? it is obliged by law to react to the normative assessment though not obliged by law, the government typically reacts (follows recommendations or explains the deviations, discusses the assessment etc) it generally does not react other *Please specify: |
| institution at the implementation stage of the budget? it is obliged by law to react to the normative assessment though not obliged by law, the government typically reacts (follows recommendations or explains the deviations, discusses the assessment etc) it generally does not react other *Please specify: |

| of fiscal policy in a medium-term perspective in terms of the following (multiple choice question): stringency of implementation of budget plans without major deviations or supplementary budgets consistency with sustainable government finances adequacy in the prevailing cyclical conditions / appropriateness in terms of stabilisation compliance with the requirements of the SGP compliance with the budgetary targets established in the SCP framework compliance with the national fiscal rules quality of government finances, e.g. in terms of composition of revenue and expenditure other |
|--|
| *Please specify: |
| |
| Additional information: |
| |
| SECTION 8: Compliance in 2016 |
| *8.1 Please indicate the type of outputs/assessments/recommendations produced in 2016 by the fiscal institution (multiple choice question): Assessment of compliance with fiscal rules |
| Endorsement of macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts Assessment of macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts Production of macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts |
| Other assessments/recommendations No assessment/recommendation produced |
| *Assessment of compliance with fiscal rules, please specify: |
| |
| *Please specify the concrete way in which the fiscal institution gave or not its endorsement of Macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts: |
| |
| |

| *Assessment of macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts, please specify: |
|--|
| |
| |
| *Production of macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts, please specify: |
| |
| *Other assessments/recommendations, please specify: |
| |
| Additional information: |
| |
| *8.2 Was there any assessment/normative statement/recommendation produced by the fiscal institution in 2016 that the government did not comply with? Yes No |
| Additional information: |
| |
| *8.3 Please specify the respective assessments/recommendations and the consequences of government's non-compliance: |
| |
| SECTION 9: End of the questionnaire |

SECTION 9: End of the questionnaire

| *9.1 Contact details of the respondent: Last name, first name, position, department, institution, address, |
|--|
| email, phone number |
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| 9.2 Remarks/ feedback concerning the questionnaire: |
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| Meta Information |
| victa information |
| |
| Creation date |
| |
| |
| |
| Last update date |
| Last update date |
| |
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| |
| * Identifier of the questionnaire (please do not change this field): |
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