

# Independent fiscal institutions in the EU Member States in 2010

This questionnaire refers to the independent fiscal institutions operating in your country in 2009 (see on-line information at [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/db\\_indicators/fiscal\\_governance/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/index_en.htm)) or new fiscal institution established in 2010.

Questions marked with an asterisk \* require an answer to be given.

## 1 Changes to fiscal institutions operating in 2009 and 2010 establishment of new fiscal institutions.

1.1 Please choose from:

\*

The present fiscal institution was established in 2010


The present fiscal institution was established before 2010

 1.2 Please specify: since the last update of the dataset until the end of 2010, this fiscal institution has been \*

unchanged

reformed

closed

 Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



1.3 Please explain the main reasons for closing the fiscal institution. Please indicate the date of important decisions taken.

\*

(maximum 1000 characters)

## 2 General description of the fiscal institution



2.1 Please indicate the official name of the fiscal institution in the language of your country: \*

(maximum 100 characters)



2.2 Please indicate the official abbreviation of the name of the fiscal institution in the language of your country: \*

(maximum 50 characters)



2.3 Please indicate the official name of the fiscal institution in English (if available): (maximum 100 characters)



2.4 Please indicate the official abbreviation of the name of the fiscal institution in English (if available):

(maximum 50 characters)



2.5 Please indicate relevant dates for the fiscal institution:

start of discussions on the creation of the fiscal institution (YYYY): \* (between 4 and 4 characters)



2.6 decision to establish the fiscal institution taken (YYYY): \* (between 4 and 4 characters)



2.7 fiscal institution started operating (YYYY): \* (between 4 and 4 characters)



2.8 Please provide a general description of the fiscal institution:

\*

(maximum 4000 characters)



2.9 Since the last update of the fiscal governance database in 2009, please describe the changes affecting the fiscal institution:

\*

(maximum 2000 characters)



2.10 Please indicate the main reasons for the reform of the existing fiscal institution.

Please mention any related particular events (such as institutional reform, changes in legislation to adapt to the requirements of the Treaty fiscal framework, etc.)

Please indicate the date of important decisions taken.

\*

(maximum 2000 characters)


### 3 Activities of the fiscal institution

3.1 Please specify the fields of activity of the fiscal institution according to its mandate: \*


- it is limited to fiscal policy       it also covers other areas of economic analysis

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

 3.2 Please specify the fields of activity of the fiscal institution other than fiscal policy: \*

- macroeconomics
- international economics, trade
- financial markets
- labour economics incl. migration
- industrial organisation/competition
- sectoral and/or regional economic activity
- environment and climate
- other

 Please, specify:

\*  
(maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

3.3 Please indicate the tasks fulfilled by the fiscal institution: \*

- provision of analysis on fiscal policy developments without normative judgement
- provision of independent macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts
- issuing normative statements (involving judgement) on fiscal policy
- issuing recommendations (considering policy alternatives) in the area of fiscal policy
- other



Please, specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:


(maximum 500 characters)

# 4 Fiscal institutions providing independent analysis on fiscal policy developments

4.1 Please indicate the analytical activities of the fiscal institution that are explicitly part of its mandate:

\*

- technical analysis of the budget, without the provision of judgement
- monitoring of the implementation of budget plans
- quantification of short-term and long-term budgetary effects of envisaged policy measures and reforms
- other

 Please, specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

4.2 Please indicate the analytical activities of the fiscal institution carried out regularly, though not making explicitly part of its mandate: \*

- technical analysis of the budget, without the provision of judgement
- monitoring of the implementation of budget plans
- quantification of short-term and long-term budgetary effects of envisaged policy measures and reforms
- other



Please, specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:


(maximum 500 characters)



4.3 Please specify the sectors of general government on which the above activities are provided by the fiscal institution:

\*

- the whole of general government
- central government (the State and other central government entities)
- the State or federal government, without other central government entities
- regional governments (autonomous regions or federated states)
- local governments
- social security
- other

 Please, specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:


(maximum 500 characters)

## 5 Fiscal institutions providing forecasts and/or long-term projections of macroeconomic and/or budgetary variables

5.1 Please indicate the type of forecasts provided by the fiscal institution:


\*

- macroeconomic variables
- government expenditures based on policy measures announced in specific documents (e.g. budget law or specific economic policy decisions)
- government revenues
- government balance
- government debt
- other

 macroeconomic variables, please specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)

 government expenditures, please specify: \* (maximum 200 characters)



government revenues, please specify:



(maximum 200 characters)



government balance, please specify: \*

(maximum 200 characters)



government debt, please specify:



(maximum 200 characters)



other, please specify: \* (maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

5.2 Does the fiscal institution provide long-term projections? \*

Yes

No



5.2.1 What sorts of projections are then provided?

\*

projections on macroeconomic variables

projections on budgetary variables

other



macroeconomic variables, please specify:



(maximum 200 characters)



budgetary variables, please specify:



(maximum 200 characters)




other, please specify:




(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

 5.3 Please specify the time horizon of the long-term projections: \*

- |                                      |  |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| <input type="radio"/> 5 to 10 years  | <input type="radio"/> more than 20 years |
| <input type="radio"/> 10 to 20 years | <input type="radio"/> other              |

 Please, specify:

\*  
(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

5.4 Please specify the sectors of general government for which forecasts are provided by the fiscal institution:

\*

- the whole of general government
- central government (the State and other central government entities)
- the State or federal government, without other central government entities
- regional governments (autonomous regions of federated states)
- local governments
- social security
- other



Please, specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



5.5 Please indicate the role of the forecasts of macroeconomic variables for the preparation of the state budget: \*

- there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the forecasts
- there is a political agreement within the executive or between executive and legislative powers that the forecasts are generally used
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the projections of the fiscal institution have to be justified publicly
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification
- other



Please specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)





5.6 Please indicate the role of the forecasts of government expenditure based on announced policy measures (see question 5.1) for the preparation of the state budget: \*

- there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the forecasts
- there is a political agreement within the executive or between executive and legislative powers that the forecasts are generally used
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the projections of the fiscal institution have to be justified publicly
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification
- other



Please, specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



5.7 Please indicate the role of the forecasts of government revenue for the preparation of the state budget: \*

- there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the forecasts
- there is a political agreement within the executive or between executive and legislative powers that the forecasts are generally used
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the projections of the fiscal institution have to be justified publicly
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification
- other



Please, specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



5.8 Please indicate the role of the forecasts of the government balance for the preparation of the state budget: \*

there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the forecasts

the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the projections of the fiscal institution have to be justified publicly

the government is free to use its own forecasts, but has to take or automatically takes the forecasts of the fiscal institution as a base.

there is a political agreement within the executive or between executive and legislative powers that the forecasts are generally used

the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification

other



Please, specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



5.9 Please indicate the role of the forecasts of macroeconomic variables for the preparation of the Stability

Programme or Convergence Programme (SCP) respectively: \*

- |   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| <input type="radio"/> there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the forecasts  | <input type="radio"/> the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the projections of the fiscal institution have to be justified publicly | <input type="radio"/> the government is free to use its own forecasts, but has to take or automatically takes the forecasts of the fiscal institution as a base. |
| <input type="radio"/> there is a political agreement within the executive or between executive and legislative powers that the forecasts are generally used | <input type="radio"/> the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification   | <input type="radio"/> other  |



Please,specify:


\*

(maximum 200 characters)




Additional information:


(maximum 500 characters)

 5.10 Please indicate the role of the forecasts of government expenditure based on announced policy measures

(see question 5.1) for the preparation of the SCP: \*

- there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the forecasts
- there is a political agreement within the executive or between executive and legislative powers that the forecasts are generally used
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the projections of the fiscal institution have to be justified publicly
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, but has to take or automatically takes the forecasts of the fiscal institution as a base.
- other

 Please specify: \* (maximum 200 characters)

 Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



5.11 Please indicate the role of the forecasts of government revenue for the preparation of the SCP: \*

- there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the forecasts
- there is a political agreement within the executive or between executive and legislative powers that the forecasts are generally used
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the projections of the fiscal institution have to be justified publicly
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, but has to take or automatically takes the forecasts of the fiscal institution as a base.
- other



Please, specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



5.12 Please indicate the role of the forecasts of the government balance for the preparation of the SCP: \*

there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the forecasts

the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the projections of the fiscal institution have to be justified publicly

the government is free to use its own forecasts, but has to take or automatically takes the forecasts of the fiscal institution as a base.

there is a political agreement within the executive or between executive and legislative powers that the forecasts are generally used

the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification

other



Please, specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



5.13 Please indicate the role of the forecasts of macroeconomic variables for medium-term budgetary planning

apart from the preparation of the SCP (if any): \*

there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the forecasts

the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the projections of the fiscal institution have to be justified publicly

there is no medium-term budgetary planning apart from the preparation of the SCP

there is a political agreement within the executive or between executive and legislative powers that the forecasts are generally used

the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification

other



Please specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)





5.14 Please indicate the role of the forecasts of government expenditure based on announced policy measures

(see question 5.1) for medium-term budgetary planning apart from the preparation of the SCP (if any): \*

- |   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| <input type="radio"/> there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the forecasts  | <input type="radio"/> the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the projections of the fiscal institution have to be justified publicly | <input type="radio"/> there is no medium-term budgetary planning apart from the preparation of the SCP |
| <input type="radio"/> there is a political agreement within the executive or between executive and legislative powers that the forecasts are generally used | <input type="radio"/> the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification   | <input type="radio"/> other  |



Please specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



5.15 Please indicate the role of the forecasts of government revenue for medium-term budgetary planning apart from the preparation of the SCP (if any): \*

- there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the forecasts
- there is a political agreement within the executive or between executive and legislative powers that the forecasts are generally used
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the projections of the fiscal institution have to be justified publicly
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification
- is no medium-term budgetary planning apart from the preparation of the SCP
- other



Please specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



5.16 Please indicate the role of the forecasts of the government balance for the preparation of medium-term budgetary planning apart from the preparation of the SCP (if any): \*

- there is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the forecasts
- there is a political agreement within the executive or between executive and legislative powers that the forecasts are generally used
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the projections of the fiscal institution have to be justified publicly
- the government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification
- there is no medium-term budgetary planning apart from the preparation of the SCP
- other



Please specify: \* (maximum 200 characters)




Additional information:  
(maximum 500 characters)

## 6 Fiscal institutions doing normative statements and issuing recommendations

6.1 Please indicate the activities of the fiscal institution in the area of normative statements and issuing recommendations that are explicitly part of its mandate: \*

- normative assessment of the draft government budget
- recommendations on changes of fiscal policy measures specified in the draft government budget
- normative assessment/monitoring in the implementation stage of the budget
- recommendations on changes of fiscal policy measures in the implementation stage of the budget
- normative assessment of economic programmes of political parties ahead of elections
- other

 Please specify:


\*  
(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

6.2 Please indicate the analytical activities of the fiscal institution in the area of normative statements and issuing recommendations that are carried out though not making explicitly part of its mandate: \*

- normative assessment of the draft government budget
- recommendations on changes of fiscal policy measures specified in the draft government budget
- normative assessment/monitoring in the implementation stage of the budget
- recommendations on changes of fiscal policy measures in the implementation stage of the budget
- normative assessment of economic programmes of political parties ahead of elections
- other

 Please specify:

\*  
(maximum 200 characters)


Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

6.3 Please specify the sectors of government on which assessments or recommendations are formulated by the fiscal institution:

\*

- the whole of general government sector
- central government (the State and other central government entities)
- the State or federal government, without other central government entities
- regional governments (autonomous regions of federated states)
- local governments
- social security
- other

 Please specify: \* (maximum 200 characters)


Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

6.4 Please specify the way in which the government interacts with the fiscal institution in the planning stage of the budgetary process:

\*

- the government is obliged by law to consult the fiscal institution
- the government does not publicly consult the fiscal institution
- the government generally consults the fiscal institution, though not obliged by law
- other

 Please specify: \* (maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

6.5 Please specify the way in which the parliament interacts with the fiscal institution in the planning stage of the budgetary process:

\*

- the fiscal institution has to be audited by the parliament (legal obligation)
- there is no formal consultation of the fiscal institution by the parliament
- the fiscal institution is generally audited by the parliament, though there is no such legal obligation
- other



Please specify: \* (maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



6.6 Please specify if the fiscal institution provides normative assessment of the draft government budget in terms of the following:

\*

- consistency with sustainable government finances
- adequacy in the prevailing cyclical conditions / appropriateness in terms of stabilisation
- compliance with national fiscal rules in force
- compliance with the requirements of the SGP
- compliance with the budgetary targets established in the SCP framework
- compliance with the rules and budgetary targets established by the medium-term budgetary framework (if such a framework other than the SCP exists)
- validity of the macroeconomic forecasts used for budget preparation (unless the government uses forecasts of the fiscal institution)
- validity of the budgetary forecasts used for budget preparation (unless the government uses forecasts of the fiscal institution)
- quality of government finances, e.g. in terms of composition of revenue and expenditure
- other





Please specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



6.7 How does the government react to the normative assessment of the draft government budget provided by the fiscal institution? \*

- it is obliged by law to provide a statement on the assessment
- it reacts informally by a technical meeting with representatives of the fiscal institution
- other
- though not obliged by law, it typically provides a public statement on the assessment
- it generally does not react



Please specify:



(maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



6.8 Does the fiscal institution issue recommendations to change fiscal policy measures specified in the draft government budget in order to enhance its quality in terms of the following: \*

- consistency with sustainable government finances
- adequacy in the prevailing cyclical conditions / appropriateness in terms of stabilisation
- compliance with national fiscal rules in force
- compliance with the requirements of the SGP
- compliance with the budgetary targets established in the SCP framework
- compliance with the rules and budgetary targets established by the medium-term budgetary framework (if such a framework other than the SCP exists)
- validity of the macroeconomic forecasts used for budget preparation (unless the government uses forecasts of the fiscal institution)
- validity of the budgetary forecasts used for budget preparation (unless the government uses forecasts of the fiscal institution)
- quality of government finances, e.g. in terms of composition of revenue and expenditure
- other



Please specify:



(maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



6.9 How does the government react to the recommendations from the fiscal institution to change fiscal policy measures specified in the draft government budget? \*

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="radio"/> it generally follows the recommendations | <input type="radio"/> it follows few recommendations, if any |
| <input type="radio"/> it follows some recommendations          | <input type="radio"/> other                                  |



Please specify: \* (maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



6.10 Is there a legal obligation for the government to explain if it decides not to follow the recommendations of the fiscal institution to change fiscal policy measures specified in the draft government budget?

Yes

No



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

6.11 Were the recommendations formulated by the fiscal institution to change fiscal policy measures specified in the draft government budget followed in 2010? \*

yes, they were fully followed

only a few were followed

other

yes, they were broadly followed

they were not followed



Please specify the reasons for not following recommendations: [Max 500 characters] \* (maximum 500 characters)




Other, please specify:

\*


(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:


(maximum 500 characters)

 6.12 Please specify if the fiscal institution provides normative assessment/monitoring at the implementation stage of the budget in terms of the following:

- implementation of the budget law in general, including alert in case of substantial deviations from plans
- consistency with sustainable government finances
- adequacy in the prevailing cyclical conditions / appropriateness in terms of stabilisation
- compliance with national fiscal rules in force
- compliance with the requirements of the SGP
- compliance with the budgetary targets established in the SCP framework
- compliance with the rules and budgetary targets established by the medium-term budgetary framework (if such a framework other than the SCP exists)
- quality of government finances, e.g. in terms of composition of revenue and expenditure
- other

 Please specify:

\*  
(maximum 200 characters)

 Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



6.13 How does the government react to the normative assessment/monitoring provided by the fiscal institution at the implementation stage of the budget? \*

- it is obliged by law to provide a statement on the assessment
- it reacts informally by a technical meeting with representatives of the fiscal institution
- other
- though not obliged by law, it typically provides a public statement on the assessment
- it generally does not react



Please specify: \* (maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:  
(maximum 500 characters)



6.14 Does the fiscal institution issue recommendations to change fiscal policy measures at the implementation stage of the budget in order to enhance its quality in terms of the following: \*

- consistency with the budget law in case of deviations
- consistency with sustainable government finances
- adequacy in the prevailing cyclical conditions / appropriateness in terms of stabilisation
- compliance with national fiscal rules in force
- compliance with the requirements of the SGP
- compliance with the budgetary targets established in the SCP framework
- compliance with the rules and budgetary targets established by the medium-term budgetary framework (if such a framework other than the SCP exists)
- quality of government finances, e.g. in terms of composition of revenue and expenditure



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



6.15 How does the government react to the recommendations of the fiscal institution to change fiscal policy measures at the implementation stage of the budget? \*

- it generally follows the recommendations
- only few recommendations are followed
- other
- it follows some recommendations
- it generally does not react





Please specify:



(maximum 200 characters)



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)



6.16 Is there a legal obligation for the government to justify if it decides not to follow the recommendations of the fiscal institution to change fiscal policy measures in the implementation stage of the budget? \*



Yes



No



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

6.17 Were the recommendations formulated by the fiscal institution to change fiscal policy measures specified at the implementation stage of the budget followed in 2010?

\*

- yes, they were fully followed       only a few were followed       other  
 yes, they were broadly followed       they were not followed



Please specify the reasons for not following recommendations:

\*

(maximum 500 characters)



Please specify:

\*


(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

6.18 Please specify if the fiscal institution provides normative assessment of the conduct of fiscal policy in a medium-term perspective in terms of the following: \*

- stringency of implementation of budget plans without major deviations or supplementary budgets
- consistency with sustainable government finances
- adequacy in the prevailing cyclical conditions / appropriateness in terms of stabilisation
- compliance with national fiscal rules in force
- compliance with the requirements of the SGP
- compliance with the budgetary targets established in the SCP framework
- compliance with the rules and budgetary targets established by the medium-term budgetary framework (if such a framework other than the SCP exists)
- validity of the macroeconomic forecasts used for budget preparation (unless the government uses forecasts of the fiscal institution)
- validity of the budgetary forecasts used for budget preparation (unless the government uses forecasts of the fiscal institution)
- quality of government finances, e.g. in terms of composition of revenue and expenditure
- other

 Please specify:

\*  
(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

6.19 Does the fiscal institution issue recommendations on changes of fiscal policy in a more medium-term perspective in order to enhance its quality in terms of the following: \*

- stringency of implementation of budget plans without major deviations or supplementary budgets
- consistency with sustainable government finances
- adequacy in the prevailing cyclical conditions / appropriateness in terms of stabilisation
- compliance with national fiscal rules in force
- compliance with the requirements of the SGP
- compliance with the budgetary targets established in the SCP framework
- compliance with the rules and budgetary targets established by the medium-term budgetary framework (if such a framework other than the SCP exists)
- validity of the macroeconomic forecasts used for budget preparation (unless the government uses forecasts of the fiscal institution)
- validity of the budgetary forecasts used for budget preparation (unless the government uses forecasts of the fiscal institution)
- quality of government finances, e.g. in terms of composition of revenue and expenditure

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

## 7 The governing/high-level board of the fiscal institution

7.1 Please specify the size of the governing/high-level board of the fiscal institution \* (between 1 and 99)


Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

7.2 Please specify the composition of the governing/high-level members of the fiscal institution:

\*

- academics
- policy experts
- politicians
- civil servants
- members of the Monetary Policy Committee of the central bank
- members of the State Audit Office
- representatives from trade unions
- representatives from employers organizations
- other

 Please specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)


Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

7.3 Governing/high-level members of the fiscal institution are nominated by \*

the government

another body

 Please specify:

\*  
(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

7.4 Governing/high-level members of the fiscal institution are appointed by \*

the government

the parliament

another body



Please specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

7.5 Please specify the number of years of the terms of office of the members of governing/high-level board of the fiscal institution: \*

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

other



Please specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

7.6 Do the terms of office of the governing/high-level board members of the fiscal institution by default start and end simultaneously? \*

Yes

No

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

7.7 Are the governing/high-level members of the fiscal institution permitted to hold political posts during their terms of office?

\*

Yes

No

7.8 Are there other constraints? \*

Yes

No





Please specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

7.9 Please specify how the governing/high level board members of the fiscal institution adopt decisions and/or release opinions:

\*

in consensus

by qualified majority

other

in consensus, while diverging  
opinions are publicly expressed

by (simple) majority



Please specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

## 8 Status of the fiscal institution

8.1 Please indicate the legal text establishing the existence of the fiscal institution: \*

- the constitution                       ordinary law                       other
- organic law                               government decree

 Please specify: \* (maximum 200 characters)

8.2 Please provide the title of the above legal act and its articles referring to the fiscal institution: \*

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

8.3 Is the mandate of the fiscal institution explicitly defined in any official document (constitution, law or text endorsed by the parliament or government)? \*

Yes

No



Please specify:

\*

(maximum 500 characters)

8.4 Please provide a precise reference to the respective official document: \*

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

8.5 Please specify on the status of the fiscal institution:

- |   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| <input type="radio"/> it is formally attached to the parliament   | <input type="radio"/> takes orders from the government                 | <input type="radio"/> is not formally attached to government or parliament |
| <input type="radio"/> it is formally attached to the government (ministry of finance or economics or the prime minister's office) | <input type="radio"/> enjoys functional autonomy within the government | <input type="radio"/> other  |



Please specify: \* (maximum 500 characters)

8.6 Has the fiscal institution access to other sources of financing than the direct funding by the national government? \*

- Yes  No



please specify the share of these sources as per cent of the total budget of the fiscal institution \*

1 to 10

41 to 50

81 to 90

11 to 20

51 to 60

91 to 100

21 to 30

61 to 70

31 to 40

71 to 80

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

8.7 Apart from the governing board, please specify the approximate size of staff of the fiscal institution in terms of full-time jobs. Please adjust for part-time staff or for staff of an institution with a broader mandate, where only work devoted to the tasks of the fiscal institution should be considered ... economic researchers: \*

administrative staff: \*

external contributors (on average):

other, please specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

8.8 To what extent has the fiscal institution access to non-public information?

\*

- it has full access to inside information in public administration, and administrations have to respond to its requests
- it has a privileged but limited access to information in public administration
- it has access to unpublished budgetary planning documents
- it has access to detailed budgetary information from the Treasury and the budgetary authorities
- it has access to non-public microeconomic datasets for in-depth analysis
- it has access to other non-public data or information
- it has no privileged access to inside information
- other



Please specify:



(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information: (maximum 500 characters)

## 9 Output and visibility of the fiscal institution


9.1 Please list the regular publication series maintained of the fiscal institution (e.g. quarterly bulletins, annual expert opinions, working papers on background studies, etc.):



(maximum 1000 characters)

9.2 Are reports of the fiscal institution in the area of budgetary policy available to the public? \*

- no, most reports are confidential       yes, most reports are easily accessible, e.g. in the internet
- yes, most reports are available upon request       other

 Please specify:

\*  
(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

9.3 Do members of the governing/high level board of the fiscal institution publish in professional journals?

- yes, regularly       yes, occasionally       no



Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

9.4 Do members of the analytical staff of the fiscal institution publish in professional journals? \*

yes, regularly

yes, occasionally

no

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

9.5 Please describe the typical media coverage and public reaction to the activities of the fiscal institution:

\*

only in specialized press

high media activity, but not likely to invoke public debate

other

modest media and public interest

high media activity and public debate on activities, likely to induce government to react publicly



Please specify:

\*

(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

9.6 Does the activity of the fiscal institution in your view contribute to enhancing fiscal discipline? \*

no, it has a little impact on fiscal discipline

yes, it makes an important contribution to fiscal discipline

yes, it contributes somewhat to fiscal discipline

other



Please specify:


\*

(maximum 200 characters)

Additional information: (maximum 500 characters)

9.7 Does the activity of the fiscal institution in your view contribute to enhancing the quality of public finance? \*

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="radio"/> no, it has little impact on the quality of public finance     | <input type="radio"/> yes, it makes an important contribution to the quality of public finance |
| <input type="radio"/> yes, it contributes somewhat to the quality of public finance | <input type="radio"/> other  |

 Please specify: \* (maximum 200 characters)

Additional information:

(maximum 500 characters)

**Contact information and further remarks**

Contact persons for the survey.

Please provide forenames, surnames, institutions, departments, addresses, emails and phone numbers.

\*

Remarks concerning the questionnaire:

(maximum 2000 characters)