

Euro crisis – are we out of the woods?

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


Questions

- 1. Economic situation: Acute phase of the crisis over, but elevated short-term risks?
- 2. Vulnerable countries: Unwinding of imbalances completed or still on the ropes?
- 3. Policy response: Too little, too late or buffers insufficiently re-established?
- 4. EMU governance reforms: Gone too far or still need to go deeper?




Lacklustre recovery, output gap still not closed



<u>Note:</u> Dark blue line shows the weighted EA-19 average; dotted line shows the simple un-weighted EA-12 average. Light blue area defines the whole range of observed values (from maximum to minimum), while the darker blue area defines the area between the first and second quartile based on un-weighted data for EA-19. Green line shows the US.



Potential growth weak and steadily revised down, investment gap persistently large



Note: Left side: Euro area based on EA-15 (spring 2008), EA-16 (spring 2010), EA-17 (spring 2012), EA-18 (spring 2014), EA-19 (winter 2016). Right side: Investment measured as gross fixed capital formation. Red lines indicate the pre-crisis (post-crisis) average, ranging from 1999-08 (2009-17).


Source: European Commission spring 2016 forecast.



Still high unemployment, increasingly structural


Unemployment rate

(in %)



Nawru

(in % labour force)




Source: European Commission spring 2016 forecast.



Sizeable fiscal consolidation, but public debt still very high


Structural balance

(in % potential GDP)



General government gross debt


(% GDP, EDP concept)



Source: Left side: IMF WEO, April 2016; right side: European Commission spring 2016 forecast.



Reduced financial market pressure, but continued fragmentation and insufficient bank balance sheet repair



<u>Source:</u> Left side: Eurostat, monthly data, last observation April 2016; chart in the middle: ECB; right side: World Bank World Development Indicators.




Inflation persistently low, risk of unanchored inflation expectations

HICP inflation

(yoy % change)

16 14 12 10 8 6 EE 4 **ECB** target 0 FL -2 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

HICP inflation excl. energy & unproc. food (yoy % change)




<u>Note:</u> Right side: Black lines show the 2-year- (dotted line) and 5-year- (straight line) ahead inflation expectations according to the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).

Source: European Commission spring 2016 forecast.



Imbalances in vulnerable countries: unwinding but still a long way to go

Selected MIP scoreboard indicators 2008 versus 2015



IT

2008

2015

MIP threshold indicated as:

Note: Data for private debt and private credit flow are only available until 2014. Source: Eurostat.

IT

ΙT



Adjustment capacity in vulnerable countries: slow, insufficient progress


		2008			2015				
		ES	IE	PT	IT	ES	IE	PT	IT
Financial	High bond spreads ¹								
	High NPL ratios								
Macro	External imbalances								
	Internal imbalances								
	Sluggish potential growth ²								
Structural	Rigid labour markets								
	Rigid product markets								
Fiscal	Sizeable budget deficits								
	High public debt-to-GDP ratios								

<u>Note</u>: Green / orange / red stand for a low / medium / high degree of vulnerability. Comparisons made between 2015 and 2008 indicators except for: ¹ 2009-2011 period, ² longer-term average for the pre- (1999-2008) and post-crisis (2009-15) period to take into account for the longer-term nature of potential growth.



Limited leeway towards a more accomodative monetary policy

Policy rates set by the ECB and US Fed (in %)



ECB and Fed balance sheet expansion

(in % of annual nominal GDP)




Source: Left side: IHS, last observation 15 March 2016; right side: Datastream, last observation 31 March 2016.



Limited fiscal buffers

S1 indicator
Fiscal adjustment required (in % of GDP) to reach a 60% public debt-to-GDP ratio by 2030



Source: Commission services. 2016 Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCP).



Weak resilience to economic shocks

Financial sector	Leverage and risk taking	
	Liquidity and currency mismatches	
	Interconnectedness and common exposures	
Non-financial	Excessive household debt	
sector	Excessive corporate debt	
Asset	Housing booms	
markets	Stock market booms	
	Labour market flexibility	
Structural	Product market flexibility	
	Efficient administration	
Institutional	Government effectiveness	
	Stable governments	
Political	Degree of fractionalisation in parliaments	

<u>Note</u>: This assessment only serves for indicative purposes. Green / orange / red stands for a low / medium / high degree of vulnerability. <u>Source</u>: Inspired by: Röhn et al. (2015): Economic resilience: A new set of vulnerability indicators for OECD countries, *OECD Economics Department Working Papers*, No.1249.



Substantial changes in the EA governance framework

Fiscal	Stronger preventive arm SGP	 Introduction of an expenditure rule (6-P) and balanced budget rule (TSCG) Possibility of imposing sanctions (6-P) Surveillance of draft budgetary plans by Commission (2-P) 			
	Stronger corrective arm SGP	 Introduction of a numerical debt benchmark (6-P) Earlier and more gradual sanctions (6-P) More automaticity in decision-making via new voting scheme (TSCG) Enhanced surveillance for MS threatened with financial difficulties (2-P) 			
	National fiscal frameworks	Mandatory minimum requirements at the national level (accounting & statistics, forecasts, fiscal rules monitored by independent bodies, transparency)			
Macro	MIP	• Prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances via the introduction of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) (6-P)			
Crisis resolution mechanism	ESM, ECB OMT	 European Stability Mechanism (ESM) OMT programme by the European Central Bank (ECB) 			
Financial	Eur. System of Financial Supervision	 Macro-prudential: European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) Micro-prudential: European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) with EBA (for banks), ESMA (securities), EIOPA (insurance), national authorities etc. 			
	Banking Union	 Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Single Resolution Board (ERB) and Single Resolution Fund (SRB) Under construction: Common deposit insurance scheme 			

<u>Note</u>: Key reforms steps taken in the area of fiscal and macroeconomic policies are shown in italics in brackets, namely 6-Pack (6-P), Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), 2-Pack (2-P).



Minimum governance requirements for a viable EMU

		Included in 5PR?	Possible w/o Treaty change?	Political support?
Monetary	ECB as a lender of last resort			
Banking	Establish a common European Deposit Insurance Scheme			
	Implement a common backstop to the SRF			
	Improve the effectiveness of direct bank recapitalisation in the ESM			
	Create a European safe asset			
	Restore a credible no bail-out clause			
Fiscal	Create a centralised fiscal capacity			
	Establish a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism			
	Establish a debt redemption fund			
Economic	Foster convergence towards similarly resilient economic structure			

<u>Note</u>: This assessment only serves for indicative purposes. Inspired by Baldwin and Giavazzi (2016): How to fix the Eurozone: Views of leading economists, 12 February 2016, VoxEU.